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ABSTRACT
Transfers of products from internal suppliers to 
product divisions are often recorded based on some 
measurement of supplier cost. Variable common costs 
affect short run optimum product quantities for the firm 
as a whole while the costs assigned to individual product 
profit reports affect the level of output at which product 
reported profit is maximized. If reported product profit 
is highest when individual product quantities are optimal 
for the company as a whole, goal congruence is promoted.
Assume internal suppliers have S-shaped total cost 
functions with varying degrees of curvature and that 
product revenues may be expressed as simple hill-shaped 
curves. Overall optimum quantities may be determined in 
general equation form. Individual product profit reports 
may also be expressed in equation form for each costing 
method studied. Each product profit report can be analyzed 
to determine product quantities which maximize reported 
product profit. If this quantity corresponds to the 
optimum quantity for the firm as a whole, company goals 
and product manager goals are in congruence-.
Quantitative analysis shows that if actual supplier 
costs are assigned to products based on usage, the per unit 
cost charged is an average. Assume that at optimum
viii
quantities, marginal common cost exceeds average common 
cost. Marginal cost for product profit reporting purposes 
is less than marginal cost to the company so that over­
production of individual products is encouraged. Similarly, 
under-production is encouraged if average common cost 
exceeds marginal common cost.
Marginal cost transfer pricing sets prices to 
recipients equal to supplier marginal cost at actual out­
put. At optimum quantities, net marginal revenue for each 
individual product equals this transfer price. However, 
transfer prices are the equivalent of average costs to 
recipients. Product managers can add to their reported 
product profit by reducing intermediate product consumption. 
Such monopsonistic behavior may gain reported profit for 
individual products at the expense of the company as a 
whole.
Standard variable costing promotes goal congruence 
if the relevant range for determining standards is small 
and is centered about the optimum intermediate product 
quantity. If the range is not properly centered, over or 
under-production is encouraged. However, over or under­
production will indicate the direction required to shift 
the relevant range so that if standards are revised 
periodically, goal congruence is promoted.
These results were demonstrated by a computer 
simulation of manager reactions to product profit reports 
based on very simple decision rules. Numbers were assigned
ix
to model equation coefficients to represent a sample 
company with two final products and one intermediate 
product. Product managers were started at non-optimal 
outputs and quantities were adjusted after each profit 
report according to decision rules. This process continued 
for each method studied until equilibrium outputs were 
reached. Equilibrium outputs attained with each cost 
assignment method were compared to optimum quantities to 
determine if goal congruence was promoted. Testing was 
repeated several times with common cost curvature 
systematically changed to demonstrate how basic pricing/ 
costing systems react as common costs change from linearity 
to moderate curvature. The computer simulation confirmed 
that as common cost curvature increases, managers are 
increasingly misled by usage assignment and marginal cost 
transfer pricing, but continue to be led toward optimum 
outputs by standard variable costing as long as the 
relevant range is small and properly located.
x
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
The design of product line profit reports which 
stimulate managerial actions that are in the best interest 
of a company as a whole is a complex problem because of 
product interrelationships and organizational structure. 
Products may be related in the market place. If an in­
crease in demand for one product leads to an increase in 
demand for a related product, the goods are classified 
as complementary. If an increase in demand for one product 
leads to a decrease in demand for a related product, the 
products are classified as substitute goods. Inter­
relationships also result if common inputs are used in 
production.
Joint production facilities are capable of produc­
ing two or more products in varying proportions. The 
products may be produced simultaneously or separately 
and may employ common inputs exclusively or may have a 
single common input combined with independent inputs.
Joint production is economically advantageous to the 
firm if economies of scale exist for the common inputs.
If a product using the same raw material as existing 
products is added to the mix, material handling costs 
on a per unit basis will probably decrease in the short 
run. The larger size economic order quantity for 
material may also enable the company to gain higher
quantity discounts. Joint production is also one way for 
achieving product diversification. Product diversification 
also provides a technique for using otherwise idle capacity 
to serve other markets without disturbing prices in the 
existing market. The key point is that common products 
(defined as products which have one or more common inputs) 
are produced jointly because it is profitable for them to 
be produced jointly.
Authority within a corporation may be divided by 
function or by product line. Advocates of product line 
decentralization claim the following primary advantages 
over functional decentralization:
1. Product managers must consider all aspects 
of their decisions instead of evaluating only narrow 
functional aspects.
2. Product managers responsible for both 
revenues and costs are forced to think in terms of 
profit.
3. Operation planning and control is forced 
down one or more levels in the management hierarchy 
thereby freeing top managers for long range planning.
A majpr disadvantage of product line decentralization 
is the potential lack of congruence between product 
manager goals and overall company goals. "Sometimes
•^ -Franklin G. Moore, "Is Divisionalization on the 
Way Out?", Michigan Business Review, XLI (May, 1964),
26-32.
a division manager doesn't know what is good for the
company, and even if he does, he is motivated to put
2
his division's good above company good." One technique 
for attaining goal congruence is to design the product 
profit reporting system to show maximum reported profits 
for individual products at output levels which are op­
timal for the firm as a whole. Product managers 
attempting to maximize reported profit for individual 
products must simultaneously attempt to maximize company 
profits.
If there are few common inputs to the productive 
process, product managers can exercise great indepen­
dence of each other. The small number of common inputs 
are charged to the products at some transfer price.
The four most common methods of transfer pricing are:
1. Arbitrary prices established by top management
2. Prices based on some form of cost measurement.
3. Prices based on some form of market value.
4. Prices negotiated between divisional managers.
Unless a determinable market value exists for the common 
input, writers in the field tend to support various forms
2Ibid., p. 30.
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Willard E. Stone, "Intracompany Pricing," The 
Accounting Review, XXXI (October, 1956), 626.
of marginal cost transfer pricing. Goetz contends that 
transfer prices based on incremental costs "is the unique 
way to congruence of g o a l s . B i e r m a n  advocates the use 
of marginal costs of the selling unit as the cost to the 
buying unit as a necessary but not a sufficient con­
straint to lead to optimum ou t put.  ^ Dean contends that 
"negotiated competitive prices" are the most economi­
cally defensible and considers marginal cost pricing to 
be the best authoritarian pricing scheme.^ All recognize 
that transfer prices for common variable inputs become a 
part of the marginal costs of products and are therefore 
relevant to short run quantity decisions.
If many common inputs exist, logistics problems 
develop. The need for coordination between managers in­
creases and at some point an overall manager is needed 
to effectively control joint production of two or more 
products. The goal congruence problem still remains be­
cause the single manager must determine an optimal mix 
for the products. A costing system which reports maximum 
individual product profits at quantities optimal for the
Billy E. Goetz, "Transfer Prices: An Exercise in
Relevancy and Goal Congruence," The Accounting Review, 
XLII (July, 1967), 436.
5Harold J. Bierman, "Pricing Intracompany 
Transfers," The Accounting Review, XXXIV (July, 1959), 
431.
6Joel Dean, "Decentralization and Intra-Company 
Pricing," Harvard Business Review, XXXIII (July- 
August, 1955),69.
division as a whole aid in this mix decision. In this 
situation, congruence between products and divisional 
goals is needed.
THE SHORT RUN PROBLEM
The effect of common variable cost assignment may 
easily be demonstrated in a static situation. Assume 
that a company has two products, X and Y, and one common 
variable cost. Product X reported profit is maximized 
at the quantity of X which equates marginal reported 
revenues and marginal reported costs. If common variable 
costs are not charged to products, maximum reported profit 
occurs at some quantity X in Figure 1. This is a stable 
equilibrium point because any change in quantity reduces 
reported profit. The manager has no way of knowing that 
some other quantity is best for the company as a whole.
At this equilibrium, the cost line slope is equal to the 
marginal cost of product X before considering common 
costs. Any additional variable costs charged to X will 
increase both the height of the total cost curve and its 
slope at any level of output. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Reported product profits are not only smaller 
but also will reach a maximum point at some lower quantity 
X' . If common variable costs are not charged to products 
at some price, marginal costs are understated and managers 
are led to produce more than the optimum quantity for the 
company as a whole.
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> OUTPUT
Figure 1
Outputs Before and After 
Common Cost Assignment
Marginal costs are the key to determining optimal 
quantities. However, marginal costs for curvilinear 
functions depend upon the level of production. For 
common variable costs, the level of production depends 
upon the output of both products. Assume that two 
final products require a common input and that the 
classical S-shape cost curve is a reliable predictor 
of common input costs. The general equation form would be
7(1) CC = a + bZ - cZ2 + dZ3
where CC is the cost of supplying intermediate product 
Z to producers of final products X and Y. The marginal 
cost of Z will be the derivative of (1) or:
(2) = b . 2cZ + 3dZ2
dZ
Clearly, the marginal cost of Z depends upon the level 
of Z output which in turn will be a function of the 
output of both products X and Y. Therefore, a change 
in output of X will cause the marginal cost of Z to 
change for both X and Y. As the bending or curvature 
of the common cost curve becomes greater, the change 
in marginal cost caused by a shift in output will also 
be greater. Similarly, a change in Y output will 
affect the marginal cost of Z. Common cost changes 
cannot be identified with a single product. Both 
products must be considered simultaneously. The pricing 
or cost assignment method selected will determine equilib­
rium quantities at which reported profits for each of the 
two products are maximized in the short run. A primary 
aspect of goal congruence is a determination of how 
closely this equilibrium corresponds to optimum short 
run quantities for the company as a whole.
THE DYNAMIC PROBLEM
A second aspect of goal congruence involves the 
dynamics of reaching equilibrium points. Intuitively,
the system which causes equilibrium points to correspond 
to the overall optimum quantities must account for the 
products' relationships to each other. However, if a 
change in quantity X causes a change in the common cost 
charged to Y, greater time may be required to reach 
equilibrium points. If production and demand functions 
shift after short time intervals, a common input pricing 
system must also lead toward optimum quantities quickly.
QUANTITY
OPTIMUM
QUANTITY PATH 1
PATH 2
* TIME
Figure 2
Dynamic Approaches 
Toward Equilibrium
Assume that systems 1 and 2 lead managers from 
the same starting points toward equilibrium quantity 
levels by following paths 1 and 2 respectively. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, path 1 eventually reaches an 
equilibrium very close to the optimum quantity. How­
ever, path 2 leads the manager to a point near the
optimum quantity in a shorter length of time. During 
the time periods when path 2 is closer to the optimum 
quantity, system 2 provides higher profits. The time 
value of money makes a dollar of income flow today worth 
more than a dollar of income flow in the distant future. 
Even after path 1 becomes closer to the optimum quantity, 
several time periods will be required for the summation 
of discounted system 1 profits to catch up and exceed 
the summation of discounted system 2 profits. At some 
high discount rate, system 2 could never catch up. If 
the optimum quantity shifts periodically, the pricing 
or costing system which most rapidly approaches the 
optimum quantity will best promote congruence between 
product profit reports and company profit maximizing 
goals.
METHODOLOGY
This dissertation will assume that congruence 
between product profit reports and company-wide profit 
maximizing goals is the sole criterion for evaluating 
common cost assignment systems. This restrictive 
assumption is imposed because of the need for a single 
purpose. Arthur L. Thomas concluded that allocations 
in external reports are inherently arbitrary because 
no single method can be justified for all purposes served. 
Without agreement as to purpose, objective criteria do 
not exist.
In contrast, the allocations that are employed 
in managerial accounting often need to be 
satisfactory only to a single user or to a 
small group of users who share common purposes.'
I tentatively conclude, therefore, that account­
ing's allocation problems do not always have as 
serious consequences in managerial accounting 
as they do in financial accounting. Further 
research seems warranted.?
Correspondence between product profit reports and company 
profit maximizing goals is assumed to be the common pur­
pose of managerial users.
An exhaustive review of economic literature will 
be undertaken to determine the state of current economic 
theory of the multiproduct firm as the first major section 
of the dissertation. This will be followed by develop­
ment of a basic deterministic model form as an aid to 
understanding product interrelationships caused by a 
common input factor. The model form selected will allow 
for markets which are not purely competitive and equation 
forms for separable costs and revenues will be kept as 
simple as possible to aid in the analysis of relatively 
more complex common cost equation forms. Economic 
analysis will be used to determine conditions required 
for quantities to be optimum for the firm as a whole.
The equation forms for product profit reports will 
be quantitatively analyzed for four basic pricing/alloca­
tion techniques. The analysis will determine if product
7Arthur L. Thomas, "Useful Arbitrary Allocations," 
The Accounting Review, XLVI (July, 1971), 477.
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statements report maximum profit at or near company-wide 
optimum quantities as curvature of the common cost function 
varies from zero to moderate. In addition, terms which 
reflect the interrelationship between final products for 
reporting purposes will be analyzed to determine if a 
method is likely to affect the length of time required 
for managers to reach an equilibrium as common cost 
curvature varies. Where possible, this analysis will be 
based on partial derivatives of general equation forms 
developed. Allocation/pricing techniques selected for 
analysis will include:
1. Flexible costing - A marginal cost transfer 
pricing system developed by F. B. Putney in a related 
dissertation.
2. Usage assignment - Assignment of actual cost 
based on relative usage of the common input.
3. Market value allocation - Common variable 
costs are assigned to final products based on relative 
market values.
4. Standard costing - A method based on relative 
usage with unit costs held constant to eliminate the 
influences of random variations and/or curvature.
In the third major section, numerical coefficients 
will be assigned to the general model form to allow 
laboratory type testing of the various systems. "Hill- 
climbing" techniques will be used to determine equilibrium 
quantities at which reported profit for each final product
12
is maximized if the flexible costing method is used. The 
amount of common cost curvature will be systematically 
varied to show the effect of curvature on equilibrium. This 
process will be repeated for each of the costing/pricing 
methods examined to demonstrate the quantitative analysis 
results. Also in the third major section, computer simula­
tion of product manager reactions to profit reports will be 
used to observe reactions to profit reports prepared using 
the 4 basic systems. Product manager decision rules will 
be based on the following behavioral assumptions:
1. Managers rely solely on product profit 
reports for inputs to the quantity decision. This 
simplification will isolate the effects of the system 
being tested.
2. Managers can and will adjust short run 
quantities after each profit report in an attempt to 
improve reported profit for individual products.
3. The entire output for each time period
will be sold at prices dictated by the revenue equations. 
This simplification avoids problems of assigning costs 
to inventories.
4. As long as a quantity change (increase or 
decrease) improves reported profits, managers will con­
tinue to change quantities in the same direction. If a 
change in one direction decreases reported profits, the 
next quantity change will be in the opposite direction.
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5. Managers will communicate planned changes to 
the common cost center so that common costs react to 
changes in output insterntaneously.
The curvature of common input costs will be changed 
systematically to determine how the relative degree of 
curvature affects the time required to reach an equilibrium 
starting from some arbitrary sub-optimal quantity.
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The research approach and results obtained will 
be limited by several factors. The study focuses on 
costing/pricing systems for common input costs only and 
will assume that market interrelationships are either 
non-existent or are neutralized by other means. Only 
one general deterministic model will be used in the study 
because the multitude of economic models of varying 
complexity cannot all be evaluated in a systematic manner. 
As in any laboratory type test, the validity of the results 
obtained will depend upon the reasonableness of the 
assumptions used. For the dynamic test, there has been 
little research on how managers react to product profit 
reports and there are no widely accepted general models 
of this decision process. Because of the very large 
number of iterations required by the study, the use of 
experienced managers or students in a laboratory setting 
is not considered feasible. Costing or pricing systems 
may be used to serve many purposes such as external re­
porting, inventory valuation, etc. This study will be 
restricted to the single purpose of attaining goal 
congruence between product managers and overall company 
profit maximizing goals.
The purposes of the study will be to isolate to 
the fullest extent possible the common cost curvature 
variable and to analyze and demonstrate the effect of 
this variable on product profit reports given goal 
congruence between these profit reports and short run 
company-wide profit as the objective. If this purpose 
is accomplished, a foundation will have been laid for 
further study and a guide will have been provided for 
the selection of an appropriate costing or pricing 
method given the goal congruence objective.
Chapter 2
MULTI-PRODUCT FIRM ECONOMICS
Although most micro-economics textbooks concen­
trate on the single product firm, Clemens points out 
that "it is probably impossible to find in the whole 
of our economy a single firm that sells a single
O
product at a single price." Even if products are 
completely independent in both demand and production, 
diversification reduces the risk of business failures. 
Generally products will be related in either demand or 
production and these interrelationships provide oppor­
tunities for profit expansion which would not be 
available to a group of single product firms without 
collusion.
RELATED DEMANDS
If products are related in the market place, 
sales of one product will influence the sales of other 
products. In mathematical terms, total revenue, TR, is 
based on the prices and quantities of products 1 and 2:
(1) TR = PiQi + P2Q2
q
E. W. Clemens, "Price Discrimination and the 
Multiple-Product Firm," Review of Economic Studies, 
XIX (1950-51), 1.
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The price of product 1 is a function of product 1 quantity 
sold. In addition, sales of product 1 will affect demand 
for product 2. Similarly, product 2 price is a function 
of product 2 quantity and product 2 sales affect demand 
for product 1. Thus, marginal revenues for products 
1 and 2 are:
(2) MRX = = PL + Qi^l + Q.lii
3Ql 1 13Q1 3QX
p 3P.
(3) MR2 = 9TR = p + Q 312 + Q.-UL
302 3Q2 13Q2
In the above equations, P^ could be regarded as a base
price which consumers would pay if only one unit of
product 1 were sold. The term represents an
-■-SQ!
adjustment to this base price for the quantity of product 
1 being produced and sold. This term is usually nega­
tive because price must be reduced to sell larger quanti-
3P
ties of normal goods. The third term, Q, 2., shows the
z3Ql
effect on revenues from product 2 when an additional unit 
of product 1 is sold. If the products are complementary 
such as cameras and film, the term will be positive. For 
substitutes such as Chevrolets and Buicks, the term would 
be negative and for unrelated goods, the term value would
g
be zero.
If each of the products were produced and sold by 
independent companies, each company would attempt to
g
Eugene F. Brigham and James L. Pappas, Managerial 
Economics (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1972) ,
pp. 303-15.
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maximize profits without considering the effect of actions
on other companies (i.e. the Q_.s_£ value) .
23Qx
Assuming that product markets are not perfectly com­
petitive, profits may be increased by coordinating the 
quantities sold. Such coordination would require an agree­
ment for one of the independent companies to pay the other 
company to produce and sell some quantity other than its 
optimum quantity without a subsidy. As an example, assume 
that an independent film producer can increase film sales 
and profits if more cameras are sold to consumers. Assume 
that the independent camera producer is currently selling 
Qq cameras at a price PQ. The film producer would 
determine the marginal film profit based on the sale of 
one additional camera. If this marginal profit is greater 
than the marginal loss incurred by the camera producer 
if he sells Qq + 1 cameras, both producers can gain if 
the film manufacturer subsidizes cameras. This subsidy 
process would continue until the marginal profit from 
additional film sales is equal to the marginal loss of 
profit before the subsidy for the camera manufacturer.
It is difficult to arrange and enforce a collusive 
agreement such as this. However, if both products are 
produced and sold by a single firm, top management can 
provide the necessary information and coordination so that 
overall profit is maximized. The appropriate output levels 
would be such that "the increment to total revenue of the 
firm as a whole from producing one more unit of either
18
product equals the increment to total firm costs.
If management wishes to decentralize the price/ 
output/mix decisions, the divisions could be encouraged 
to negotiate the subsidy between themselves with top 
management serving in an enforcement capacity. Another 
coordination tool favored by Hirshleifer is for top 
management to determine per unit tax and subsidy rates, 
incorporate these rates in divisional profit statements, 
and then allow divisional managers to maximize divisional 
reported profits after the taxes and s u b s i d i e s . I t  
will be assumed in analyzing costing systems that either 
products are independent or that appropriate tax and 
subsidy systems are reflected in divisional net revenues.
JOINT PRODUCTS AND BY-PRODUCTS
Multiple products also result from common proces­
sing. There are few production processes which produce 
only one output. At a minimum, the process produces a 
single product plus scrap. If a market is found, the 
scrap is reclassified as a by-product. By-products are 
defined as saleable outputs which are so insignificant in 
comparison with major products that their costs and
■L0Jack Hirshleifer, "Economics of the Divisionalized 
Firm," The Journal of Business, XXX (April, 1957), 98.
J-^Ibid., p. 101
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revenues are not considered in short run output de-
12cisions. In some cases, the by-product gains m  relative 
significance and is considered in output decisions. At 
this point, the product is referred to as a co-product.
The terms scrap, by-product, and co-product all 
imply such close technological dependence that at least 
part of the conversion from raw materials to finished 
products occurs simultaneously in a common production 
process. The output from this common process may or may 
not be further processed to provide a finished good. In 
addition, the outputs may be in fixed or variable pro­
portions. The fixed proportion case is a special form 
of the co-product process and is usually referred to 
as a joint process producing joint products.
The short run decision for joint products must 
consider both products simultaneously. As long as both 
products are being sold there is no definitive marginal 
cost for a single product. Instead, the sum of the 
marginal revenues from all products must be compared with 
the marginal cost of the joint process to determine output.
If proportions can vary, a marginal cost for one 
product can be obtained by holding the output of other
12R. P. Manes and Vernon L. Smith, "Economic 
Joint Costs: Theory and Accounting Practice," The
Accounting Review, XL (January, 1965) , 31-5, provide 
a more precise definition based on whether or not some 
output of one product must be discarded to keep sales at 
unitary elasticity.
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products constant. However, this marginal cost will 
usually be a function of the level of output for all 
other products. Therefore, the product mix/output de­
cision must still consider the marginal revenues and 
marginal costs of all products simultaneously to arrive 
at an overall optimum output.
Brigham and Pappas suggest an approach illustrated 
13m  Figure 3. The iso-cost curve C = 5 in Figure 1 is 
the locus of all possible positive output combinations 
for products A and B at a total cost of 5. Similarly, 
the other iso-cost curves represent possible output 
combinations at a total cost of 10, 18, etc. The iso­
revenue curve R = 10 is the locus of all possible output 
combinations which will yield a total revenue of 10 and
*  B OUTPUT
Figure 3
Common Variable Process 
Optimum Output
13Brigham and Pappas, op. cit., p. 308.
similar curves are drawn for total revenues of 20, 3 0 , 
etc. Point Q is the optimum output/mix for the firm 
because the excess of total revenues over total costs is 
greatest at this point.
Accounting textbooks usually point out that most 
cost allocations applied to simultaneous production from 
common facilities are solely for the purpose of valuing 
inventories. The resulting average costs should not be 
used for short run output decisions.
A serious internal accounting problem remains if 
variable proportion co-products are processed beyond the 
split-off point outside the range of authority of the 
common process manager. In such situations, some transfer 
price or cost between divisions must be established and 
if short run output decisions are to be decentralized, 
the transfer price or cost should encourage the various 
managers to independently arrive at decisions optimal for 
the company as a whole. Several writers have approached 
this problem. Smith developed a technique for costing 
the by-products from petroleum refineries based on 
mathematical p r o g r a m m i n g . ^  Putney has developed a more 
general approach which he calls flexible costing.
Flexible costing requires development of a model of cost
^ L a n g f o r d  w. Smith, Jr., "An Approach to Costing 
Joint Production Based on Mathematical Programming with 
an Example From Petroleum Refining" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Stanford University, 1962).
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equations for the common process which allow for inter­
relationships between the co-products. Partial derivatives 
of the basic cost equation are used to establish the 
marginal cost of each product as a function of the output 
of all products. This marginal cost is then used as a 
transfer price and will vary between reporting periods to 
reflect changing outputs of all products. The sum of the 
transfer prices times related outputs may be greater or 
less than the total common process cost. This departure 
from full or absorption costing is justified because for 
short run output/mix decisions, absolute profit levels 
for individual products are not required. Putney's 
technique will be examined in considerable detail in 
Chapter 3.^
Other common techniques for assigning or allocat­
ing simultaneous production costs to products include 
the market value approach and various techniques which 
attempt to measure the output of all co-products in terms 
of some common physical characteristic such as BTU content 
of petroleum products, board-feet of lumber from sawmills, 
etc.
^ F r e d e r i c k  b . Putney, "Flexible Costing: A
Proposal for Unit Costing in the Multi-Product Case" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 
1968) .
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USE OF EXCESS CAPACITY
Profit gains result if two or more products can 
be manufactured using common facilities at different 
times with nominal set-up costs for conversion between 
production runs.
Horngren and others point out the advantages of 
"special deals" to use what would otherwise be idle 
c a p acity.Assume the firm is producing product A and 
selling this product in primary market A and that the 
optimum quantity at which marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue uses only 70% of productive capacity. Expanding 
sales in market A is not profitable because the selling 
price to all buyers in A must be reduced. It may be 
possible to sell additional units of the same product in 
some other market such as a discount house at a price 
between the selling price in market A and marginal cost.
As long as the price in the second market is above marginal 
cost, profits may be increased by expanding output. If 
expanding output increases marginal cost, the quantity 
sold in the primary market A must be reduced to maintain 
the equality between marginal cost and marginal revenue. 
Overall expansion will continue until marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue in all markets. If the people in market 
A recognize the product being sold in another market as
Charles T. Horngren, Cost Accounting: A
Managerial Emphasis (2d ed.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), Chap. 12.
being substantially identical, they will attempt to buy 
the product in the low price market. The profit advantage 
is lost unless the markets can be kept separate. In 
addition, the company runs a serious risk of prosecution 
under the Robinson-Patman act for price discrimination.
Profit advantages similar to the "special deal"
but without the attendant difficulties may be obtained by
using otherwise idle facilities to produce unrelated
products. Clemens says that multi-product firms are
common because:
the conventional single product firm that is 
presumably in equilibrium when marginal revenue 
is equal to marginal cost is not in equilibrium 
if it can serve the remaining portion of the 
demand curve at a price greater than marginal 
cost without adversely disturbing its existing 
market, or, more commonly, if there is any 
accessible market for which it can produce with 
unused capacity at a price above marginal cost.^'
In the price discrimination case, the company 
profits by expanding the number of market segments with 
different elasticities of demand as long as the markets 
can be kept separate. If the products of the multi­
product firm are unrelated in demand, the markets can 
be kept separate and will likely have different elastic­
ities. Theoretically, there is no limit to this process 
of segmentation. As a practical matter, however, the 
company will reach some point at which the added profit 
from further segmentation is not worth the effort required
^ C l e m e n s ,  "Price Discrimination," p. 1.
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to add new products to the line. The firm's productive
capacity will be allocated to some manageable number of
18product markets as illustrated in Figure 4.
$
MC' -
MC
* OUTPUT
Figure 4
Capacity Allocation to Markets
In Figure 4, Clemens assumed that sales and produc­
tion of different products were measurable in terms of a 
single standard unit so that the costs and revenues in each 
market are comparable. Maximum profits are obtained if 
quantity 0-0^ is produced and sold in market 1, quantity
I8ibid., p. 5.
•^One can visualize the process as one of maximizing 
revenue after non-conversion costs such as materials and 
selling expense subject to limited conversion facilities. 
The most profitable product would be the one which brings 
in the highest net revenue per unit of conversion facility. 
Product net revenues have been converted from revenue per 
unit of individual product to net revenue per unit of 
conversion facility to allow graphical presentation. Thus, 
MR^ represents the marginal revenue which could be obtained 
if one additional unit of conversion facility is devoted 
to product 1 instead of the customary marginal revenue per 
unit of the product.
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0^-02 is produced and sold in market 2, etc. In the 
final market, the firm's marginal cost has increased to 
the point at which it is equal to marginal revenue.
At first glance, one may get the impression that 
output in market 1 should be expanded to 0* to equate 
marginal cost and marginal revenue in market 1. This 
would not increase profits because the marginal cost 
curve at 0* would be the marginal cost only if 0* repre­
sented total production. If total production is 0-0 
the addition of one unit in any of the five markets will 
require additional costs of MC'. MC1 is thus the effective 
marginal cost in all five markets. Output for each product 
should be the amount which equates marginal revenue in the 
product market to the effective marginal cost at total 
output, MC'.
The multi-product case is analogous to the case of 
a job order manufacturer who processes the last job of 
the week on overtime. Should the labor overtime premium 
be charged as direct labor to the last job scheduled 
during the week or as variable overhead to be charged 
to all jobs based on labor hours? The overtime premium 
is a result of all jobs scheduled for the week. If any 
scheduled job were expanded slightly, the overtime premium 
in total would expand in proportion to the added hours'. 
Thus, the marginal cost per labor hour of all jobs in the 
shop is the same and the accountant properly uses this as 
justification for charging the premium to variable overhead
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and assigning it to all jobs based on labor hours.
INTERNAL SUPPLIERS
Internal supplier operations have characteristics 
common to both joint production and multi-product produc­
tion to use excess capacity. An internal supplier process 
is one which supplies an intermediate product as one of 
the inputs to other productive processes. An example 
would be power generation. Normally, a single intermediate 
output is supplied to one or more production processes 
either simultaneously or at alternate intervals. It may 
or may not be possible to buy and sell the intermediate 
product outside the company. In addition, the cost of 
supplying the intermediate product may be predominantly 
fixed or predominantly variable and output may be easily 
measurable or difficult to measure.
Multi-product situations which have been discussed 
to this point require common production facilities for 
the products. The common facilities are most likely to 
be under the control of a single manager. The internal 
supplier operation uses different facilities and is 
therefore more likely to be controlled by a different 
manager. The proper determination of internal supply 
costs to various users becomes .most inportant because 
these transfer costs or prices can encourage or discourage 
independent managers in making decisions in the best 
interests of the company as a whole.
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If an external competitive market exists for the 
intermediate product, this price serves as the best basis 
for establishing transfer prices. In a competitive 
market, the firm can sell or buy as much of the inter­
mediate product as desired without affecting price.
If the buying production centers wish to buy more than 
the internal supplier wishes to supply at the market price, 
buying divisions can buy as much as the supplier is willing 
to supply and then buy the additional quantity from the 
external market. Conversely, the supplier division can 
sell any excess over the internally desired quantity in 
the external competitive market. The internal supplier 
is encouraged to expand output until his marginal cost 
equals the competitive price and the buying production 
centers expand their output until their marginal cost 
including the intermediate product equals marginal revenue. 
In making these output decisions, each manager has maximized 
reported profit for his division while simultaneously . 
maximizing profit for the company as a whole.20
An internal supplier operation is often created 
because it can supply the intermediate product at a cost 
lower than that of the external market. Due to trans­
portation charges and other distribution costs, the selling 
price to the firm may be less than the buying price even
20Jack Hirshleifer, "On the Economics of Transfer 
Pricing," The Journal of Business, XXIX (July, 1956),
178-84.
in competitive markets. As Cook points out, the existence 
of a difference between buying prices and selling prices 
often provides the reason for vertical integration.21 
The competitive market price still provides a basis for 
optimal transfer pricing. If the internal supplier con­
sistently sells in the external market, the selling price 
is most appropriate because the seller is no worse off 
than if he sold in the external market exclusively while 
the buyer expands his purchases due to the lowering of 
his supply costs. If the firm is a consistent buyer in 
the external market, the buying price is most appropriate. 
In either case, the designated market price is the oppor­
tunity cost to the firm. Even if the supplier and buying 
divisions are matched as to scale so that the firm is 
neither a buyer nor a seller in the external market, the 
proper transfer price is still determinable as the 
intersection of the supplier's marginal cost curve and 
the buying division's net marginal revenue curve.22
21paul W. Cook, Jr., "Decentralization and the 
Transfer-price Problem," The Journal of Business, XXVIII 
(April, 1955), 87-94.
22Net marginal revenue is defined as the marginal 
revenue of the final product minus marginal processing 
costs other than the cost of the intermediate product.
For a more complete description of the optimal pricing 
determination, see J. R. Gould, "Internal Pricing in 
Firms When There are Costs of Using an Outside Market," 
The Journal of Business, XXXVII (January, 1964), 61-67.
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A compelling reason for creating an internal 
supplier is the company's need for an intermediate product 
which is not readily available externally. In the absence 
of an objective external price, it may be advisable to 
consolidate an internal supplier and a single buyer into 
one operation which will be coordinated by a single mana­
ger. If the intermediate product is used by more than one 
producing division, the problem cannot be so easily avoided. 
Even if top management concludes that the internal supply 
manager should be controlled through flexible budgets 
instead of the profit center concept, some transfer price 
must still be determined to properly allocate supplier 
output among users and simultaneously encourage independent 
product managers to produce optimal quantities.
Joel Dean suggests that in the absence of an 
external market, the profit center concept may be retained 
by allowing the internal supplier to negotiate the trans­
fer price with the buyers. However, he qualifies this by 
pointing out that the negotiated price must be the same 
as it would be in a competitive market if sub-optimal 
price/output decisions are to be avoided.2  ^ The primary 
difficulty with negotiated prices is that the internal 
supplier is in a monopoly position and may be able to 
practice price discrimination between divisions and/or 
price monopolistically.
23Dean, "Decentralization," pp. 65-74.
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Monopoly pricing by the internal supplier will lead 
to sub-optimal results for the company as a whole. The net 
marginal revenue curve, previously defined as marginal 
revenue of the final product minus marginal processing costs 
other than intermediate product cost, becomes the demand 
curve for each buying division. The summation of net 
marginal revenue curves for all buying divisions may be 
represented as NMR in Figure 5. For the internal supplier, 
this demand curve results in a marginal revenue curve to him 
of MR. He maximizes reported profits for his division by 
producing Qm and selling this output at price Pm .
$
♦■OUTPUT
Figure 5
Internal Supplier Monopoly Pricing
Each division is producing and selling the quanti­
ties which will maximize divisional reported profits and 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost in all divisions. 
Company-wide profit is sub-optimal because the price 
charged by the internal supplier is greater than his
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marginal cost. If the output were expanded to Qm+1f the 
only increase in cost to the company as a whole would be X. 
The NMR curve also represents final product profit before 
considering intermediate product costs. Clearly, the addi­
tion to final product profit resulting from expansion from 
Qm to Qm+^ is greater than the marginal cost of unit Qm+i* 
By monopolistic pricing, the internal supplier has gained 
profit for his division through the loss of a greater 
amount of profit to the buying divisions. The reasoning is 
analogous to the loss to the economy as a whole when pro­
ducts are sold externally at monopolistic prices. Final 
product monopolistic prices gain profit for the firm by 
reducing output and consumer surplus for the economy as a 
whole while internal monopolistic pricing gains profit for 
the internal supplier at the expense of the company as a 
whole. It is to the company's advantage to price monop- 
olistically to outsiders but the company loses potential 
profit unless the internal supplier prices competitively.
A competitive price in Figure 4 would be Pc with competi­
tive quantity Qc supplied to the product divisions.
Since the final products of the buying divisions 
are different, it is probable that the net marginal 
revenue curves will differ in slope. If the internal 
supplier uses the different slopes to practice price 
discrimination between divisions, even more profit may 
be made by the internal supplier at the greater expense 
of the buying divisions and the company as a whole because
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"if he sets his prices properly, the discriminating 
monopolist can always expect to earn at least as much
0 A
as does an ordinary monopolist.1 Charging different 
prices to different divisions for the same intermediate 
product is easily detectable and therefore easily 
preventable. Unfortunately, it is difficult to prevent 
the internal supplier from monopoly pricing in the 
absence of an external market.
TRANSFER PRICE BASED ON MARGINAL COST
Because of the difficulty of setting proper trans­
fer prices in the absence of external markets, firms 
resort to charging buyer divisions based on some version 
of supplier cost. Goetz and others advocate the use of
2 Rmarginal costs as transfer prices. As illustrated in 
Figure 4, the internal supplier should expand output until 
his marginal cost equals buyer net marginal revenue.
If transfer prices are established at Pc for all output,
Pc will also become marginal revenue for the internal 
supplier. To maximize reported profit, the internal 
supplier produces quantity Q_, the quantity which equates 
his marginal cost and revenue. At transfer price Pc, 
buyers and sellers within the firm are motivated to produce
24william J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations 
Analysis (2nd ed.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 324-.
25Goetz, "Transfer Prices," p. 436.
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and sell optimal quantities.
Determining P may be a difficult and expensive
V
process. If a s’ingle price is to be established, models 
must be derived for supplier marginal cost and for buyer 
net marginal revenues. Development of these models will 
usually require several cost observations over a relevant 
range of output. After the models have been derived, both 
the price P_ and the quantity Q_ are determined from theW C
same set of equations as in Figure 4. It would be absurd 
to use these equations to determine price Pc and not 
determine quantity Qc . If top management knows what 
optimum quantities are, there is no reason to allow 
division managers a role in determining short run quan­
tities. Decentralization would exist in name only.
Part of the expense of developing a price model 
can be avoided by establishing a model for supplier 
marginal cost only. This model is then presented to buyer 
divisions as a supply schedule. Each buyer division 
estimates the quantity it would buy if it were the only 
buyer. These quantities are summed to determine a tentative 
transfer price. Unless supplier marginal cost is constant, 
this tentative price will be higher or lower than the 
price each division planned to pay in preparing its initial 
estimate. Each division then revises its quantity estimate 
assuming quantities purchased by other divisions will 
remain constant. The summation of these revised estimates 
leads to a set of new tentative quantities and price.
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Further estimate revisions are made until the buying 
divisions clear the market (i.e. buy the same quantity 
the supplier offers) at some transfer price equal to the
26supplier's marginal cost at the total quantity supplied.
Both of the above cost-based approaches require 
the expense of developing a cost equation for the internal 
supplier. This equation must be revised when the supplier's 
production function changes. If statistical methods are 
used, there must be a time lag between the change in 
production function and the revision of the cost equation 
to allow for a sufficient number of observations of the new 
cost structure. The problem of changing cost and revenue 
parameters is more serious if the transfer price and 
quantity is based on both supplier cost and buyer net 
marginal revenue because of the larger number of potential 
parameter changes. The marginal cost methods are theo­
retically sound and should lead managers to acceptable 
short run quantity decisions assuming parameter changes 
are small and equations are revised periodically.
The use of marginal costs to set transfer prices 
appears to provide a profit measurement for supplier 
operations. The price based on marginal cost applies to 
all units transferred so that supplier revenue equals the 
transfer price times quantity transferred. Total cost 
for the internal supplier is equal to fixed cost plus
26Hirshleifer, "Divisionalized Firm," pp. 102-4.
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average variable cost times quantity. It would be unlikely 
for supplier total cost to equal total revenue even though 
revenue is based on cost. However, it is not fair to the 
internal supplier to treat such differences as profit or 
loss for purposes of managerial efficiency evaluation. 
Assume that marginal costs for the supplier are constant.
In such a case, marginal cost would equal average variable 
cost so that the difference between reported revenue and 
total cost would be fixed cost. The manager would always 
show a loss equal to fixed cost and if he improves 
efficiency by substituting capital for labor, his fixed 
costs and reported loss will increase. Assume instead 
that the manager develops better production techniques 
which reduce average variable costs. His reportable 
revenue will also decrease so that reported profit or 
loss will not change. If the transfer price is based on 
marginal cost, reported profits will be maximized (or 
reported losses minimized) at company-wide optimum quan­
tities and will provide an incentive for proper short run 
quantity decisions. However, the profit reports cannot 
be used for other purposes. Alternative techniques such 
as flexible budgets must be used for production efficiency 
evaluations.
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SUMMARY
The transfer pricing techniques discussed in this 
chapter all emphasize the importance of marginal costs in 
short run decision making. The use of external prices 
and the use of marginal costs to set the transfer price 
should lead to the same quantity decisions. If competitive 
external prices are used, the internal supplier maximizes 
profits by expanding output until marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue. In a purely competitive market, marginal 
revenue equals price so that the transfer price equals 
marginal cost even though marginal costs were not used as 
a basis for setting the price. In either approach, buying 
divisions adjust output until this marginal "charge” to 
them equals net marginal revenue. As pointed out, the 
marginal "charges" to each buyer should be equal to prevent 
a loss of potential profit for the firm as a whole. 
Essentially, the problem involves dividing internal 
supplier output among buying divisions so that the value 
of the last unit of internally supplied product is equal 
for all buyers and is also equal to the supplier's marginal 
cost. In subsequent chapters, the marginal "charge" 
which would result from commonly used cost assignment 
techniques will be examined to determine if these 
techniques will meet or approach the above conditions.
Chapter 3
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF COST ASSIGNMENT
Typical cost accounting approaches to the internal 
supplier with two or more recipients involve measurement of 
cost for the reporting period followed by assignment of this 
cost to recipient divisions. Costs may be measured and 
assigned in total or the fixed and variable components of 
total cost may be measured separately with only the variable 
costs assigned to recipients.
ASSIGNMENT OF TOTAL VARIABLE COST
Variable costing corresponds most closely to the 
economic approaches for determining short run transfer 
prices and quantities. Fixed costs do not change with 
output over a relevant range and therefore should not in­
fluence the short run quantity decision. If fixed costs 
are assigned, the recipient division could be misled be­
cause of changes in average fixed cost with output and 
changes in the proportions of total fixed cost assigned 
to individual divisions. This illusory conversion of 
fixed costs to variable costs could cause the individual 
division manager to consider these apparent changes in 
his short run output decisions.
Management may want fixed costs assigned to 
recipients even though fixed cost should not influence
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short run decisions to prevent recipient division managers 
from thinking their divisions are substantially more 
profitable than they actually are. To satisfy this re­
quirement, the system designer should probably select 
some dollar amount (perhaps based on historical usage 
proportions) and specify that this dollar amount will be 
charged to a division each time period. Such an approach 
would clearly isolate the fixed part of the internal 
charge to prevent any influence on short run decisions.
The approach to fixed cost assignment is arbitrary. 
It should be noted that in the short run, internal 
supplier fixed cost is not influenced by output so that 
any allocation scheme will be arbitrary. Charging a 
specific dollar amount to each division merely recognizes 
the inherently arbitrary nature of fixed cost alloca­
tions. In subsequent analysis, it will be assumed that 
either fixed costs are assigned so that fixed charges to 
recipients will not change or that a variable costing 
system is in use.
Total variable cost charged to each buying divi­
sion is based on two factors. One factor is the total 
variable cost (TVC) of the internal supply operation for 
the time period measured. The second factor, (p^), is 
the proportion of total variable costs to be charged to 
division i. Charges to division i, (C^ ) will be:
(4a) C± = pjTVC 
and division reported profit will be:
(4b) = Net Revenue^ - p^TVC
TVC will vary with supplier output and supplier output is 
based on quantity used by all recipients including divi­
sion i. Depending on the method of cost assignment in 
use, p^ may also vary with the quantities used by all 
recipients including division i. The change in when 
division i output expands enough to require one additional 
supply unit is the marginal cost or price division i must 
pay for the additional unit purchased. Division i 
maximizes reported profits by continuing to expand output 
as long as net marginal revenue for an additional unit 
exceeds this marginal charge.
In the economic approaches to transfer pricing, 
there were two basic requirements for the internal pric­
ing system to attain overall optimum results. First, 
the market must be cleared (i. e. quantity supplied must 
equal quantity demanded by buyer divisions). If cost 
assignment methods are used, this requirement is usually 
met by requiring the internal supplier to provide the 
quantity demanded by recipients. In addition, at optimum 
quantities, the transfer price or charge must equal the 
internal supplier's marginal cost and the net marginal 
revenue of all recipients. If cost assignment methods 
are used, there will be one additional requirement.
Transfer pricing methods apply a single transfer 
price to all units transferred. The net marginal revenue
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curve slopes downward so that the charge per unit will equal 
net marginal revenue at the optimum point only. The 
marginal charge for additional units will vary depending 
upon cost assignment methods used. This could prevent 
recipients from reaching the optimum quantity if the 
marginal charge is so erratic in behavior that it equals 
net marginal revenue at more than one point. Thus, the 
third requirement is that marginal charges must not vary 
in a manner which will discourage recipient divisions from 
reaching the overall optimum point. Cost assignment methods 
will be analyzed to see if these requirements are met.
NET REVENUES AND SUPPLIER COSTS
For proper analysis, the nature of net revenues 
and supplier costs must be understood. There are varying 
opinions as to the nature of production costs based on 
economic theory and empirical evidence. A. A. Walters 
lists 345 references to economic literature alone regarding 
production cost functions.^ Many of these studies appear 
to provide evidence that marginal production co&ts tend to
remain constant or decrease throughout the relevant range
28of output. Eiteman and Guthrie concluded that regardless
^A. A. Walters, "Production and Cost Functions:
An Econometric Survey," Econometrica, XXXI (1963), 1-66.
28See for example Joel Dean, "Statistical 
Determination of Costs with Special Reference to Marginal 
Costs," Studies in Business Administration, VII (1936).
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of actual cost curve shape, businessmen believe that
. . 29marginal costs decrease up to or near plant capacity.
In addition to these empirical studies, Maxwell provides
theoretical support for linear cost behavior based on time
divisibility of capital i n p u t s . ^  other economists defend
the traditional theory of a U-shaped average cost curve
commonly found in textbooks. Malmgren and others point
out that accounting methods such as standard costing
impart a linear bias to company records so that empirical
studies may show linearity solely because of the nature
of available cost-output observations.^
This thesis assumes that the traditional S-shaped
total cost function will vary with different types of
internal supply operations. Each cost assignment technique
will be analyzed for its ability (or lack of ability) to
promote optimum short run quantity decisions if marginal
costs are either constant or increasing. Equation forms
for total variable cost which correspond to the possible
29wilford J. Eiteman and Glen E. Guthrie, "The 
Shape of the Average Cost Curve," The American Economic 
Review, XLII (December, 1952), 832-8.
30W. David Maxwell, "Short-Run Returns to Scale 
and the Production of Services," The Southern Economic 
Journal, XXXII (July, 1965), 1-14.
^1h . B. Malmgren, "What Conclusions Are to be 
Drawn from Empirical Cost Data," Journal Of Industrial 
Economics, VII (1959), 136-44.
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shapes supported by traditional economic literature are:
(5) TVC = bQg (constant marginal cost)
(6) TVC = bQs - cQs2 + dQs3 (marginal cost
decreases and then increases) 
where Q represents internal supplier quantity, and b, c, 
and d are constant coefficients. It should be noted that 
the constant marginal cost equation is merely a special 
case of the traditional equation form (6) with c and d 
coefficients valued at zero.
These general equations express supplier cost as 
a function of supplier output. Since the short run 
quantity decisions are made by recipient divisions, 
quantities should be expressed in terms of final output 
units. Assume division 1 uses r units of intermediate 
product for every unit of final product Q1 produced and 
sold and that division 2 uses s units of intermediate 
product for every unit of final product Q2 produced and 
sold. The two divisions will use intermediate quantities 
rQ^ and sQ2 respectively. If these are the only recipient 
divisions, internal supplier output will be the sum of 
these quantities. Substituting (rQ^ + sQ2) in equations 
(5) and (6) and simplifying yields internal supplier total 
variable cost curves as a function of final product output.
(7) TVC = brQx + bsQ2
(8) TVC = brQj^ + bsQ2 - c r ^ Q ^  - 2rcsQ.jQ2 -
c s2Q22 + dr3Q13 + 3dr2sQ12Q2 + 3drs2Q]Q22 +
ds3Q23
Fortunately, economists and accountants agree that 
price must be reduced to increase the quantity of normal 
goods sold in markets which are not purely competitive. 
Revenues for final products may thus be represented by 
equations of the form
(9) RA = KjQi - BjQj2
where R- represents revenue for product i, is the 
quantity of product i sold and K and B are constant co­
efficients.
For simplicity, assume that product division costs 
other than the cost of the intermediate product are purely 
variable and linear. Separate final product costs would 
be some constant times Q^. Subtracting the constant co­
efficient from K in equation (9) leads to a simple equation 
for net revenue or net income before considering inter­
mediate product costs.
(10) NR± = - B ^ 2
To further simplify analysis, assume the constant terms
r and s both equal 1. The constant marginal cost model 
form for a two product company with one common inter­
mediate product becomes:
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To determine the quantities which will maximize 
total profit 7rt, partial derivatives of equation (14) 
are taken with respect to and Q2, each partial 
derivative is set equal to zero, and optimum quantities 
are determined.
(15a) lli. = A, - 2B.Q., - b
3QX 1 1 1
A,- b
(15b) Q, =---1--
(16a) 37rt = A2 - 2 B2Q 2 - b
3Q,
Ao ” b
(16b) Q = — ----
2B2
Product line statements which report maximum 
profits when individual quantities are those solved for 
in (15b) and (16b) will provide goal congruence if common 
variable costs are linear.
The traditional equation form which allows for 
curvature is more complex. Continuing the assumptions 
that r and s equal 1 and fixed cost is not to be 
assigned through the variable costing system, equations
(8) and (10) form the basis for a model with curvature.
(17) NRX = A1Q1 - B-jQ^
(18) NR2 = A2Q2 - B2Q22
(19) TVC = b(Qx + Q2) - c (Q^ + Q2)2 + d(Q1 + Q2)3
(20) TTt = A1Q1 - BjQ^ + A2Q2 - B2Q22 - bQ1 - bQ2
+ cQ12+ 200^2 + cQ22 - dC^3 - 3dQi2Q2 
- 3dQ1Q22 - dQ23
46
Taking partial derivatives as before:
(21) lit = An - 2B,Q, - b + 2cQ, + 2cQ0 - 3dQ..23Q^ 1 1 1  1 2 1
- 6dQ1Q2 - 3dQ22
3 TT o
(22) — - = A2 - 2B2Q2 - b + 2cQ^ + 2cQ2 - BdQ^ ^
3Q2
- 6dQ1Q2 - 3dQ22
The quantities Q1 and Q2 which cause both equations 
(21) and (22) to equal zero will be the optimum quantities. 
If Q2 were held constant, the quantity Q-^  which causes 
equation (21) to equal zero would be optimum for the 
company as a whole given the quantity Q2. Similarly, for 
a given level Q^, equation (22) may be solved for the 
optimum quantity Q g i v e n  Q . It is apparent from the 
above equations that Q and Q c a n n o t  be determined in­
dependently of each other since the marginal cost for each 
product is a function of the output of both products.
COST ASSIGNMENT BASED ON USAGE
If the quantity of the intermediate product used 
in producing each of the two final products is measur­
able, relative usage may form the basis for cost assign­
ment. The proportion, p^, in equation ( 4 )  becomes 
Ql/(Ql + q2) for product 1 and Q2/(Q^ + Q2) for product 2. 
Individual profit reports for the linear case will be:
(23a) tr1 = A1Q1 - B ^  - + (IX^ + bQ2)
(23b) itx = A1Q1 - B ^ 2 - bQx
2 2~2 2 2 Qx + Q2 “ I “2
(24b) tt2 = A2Q2 - B2Q22 - bQ2
Taking derivatives of reported profits in equations 
(23b) and (24) and solving for quantities which maximize 
reported profits for the individual products:
t25a) ! §  = A i - 2B iQ r  b
A,- b
(25b) Q = — --
1 2Bl
(26a) ^ 2  = . 2B Q . b
dQ2 2 2 2
A0 - b
(26b) Q 2 “ -I5 7 -
When = (A^-b)/2B1# the individual profit report 
for product 1 will be at a maximum. We determined in 
(15b) that this is also the optimum quantity for the firm 
as a whole. Therefore, in setting short run quantities 
which maximize reported profits for product 1, the manager 
simultaneously sets quantities which are optimum for the 
firm. By similar reasoning, with equations (16b) and 
(26b),the manager of product 2 will also maximize firm 
profits and product 2 profits simultaneously.
Usage cost assignment could also be referred to 
as average cost assignment. The denominator of the 
proportion factor, Q^/(Qj/K^)* has the effect of dividing 
total variable cost for the intermediate product by total 
intermediate product output. This average cost per unit 
is then multiplied by the number of units used by each
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recipient to determine the total cost assigned. For a 
linear variable cost function, average unit cost, b, is 
equal to marginal cost. Therefore product managers are 
actually using marginal cost to determine output even 
though the report is based upon an average.
This simple illustration may also be used to 
demonstrate the danger of unitizing fixed costs. If 
fixed costs were included in the base of costs to be 
assigned, overall optimum quantities in (15b) and (16b) 
would remain unchanged because the derivative of a con­
stant is zero. Profit reports for product 1 become:
(27a) ^  = AA  - BlQl2 - [a * b(Ql + Q2]
(27b) 1TX = AA  - BlQl2 - 0 -a°+\  - bQx
X M
The derivative of (27b) is
8tt 1 aQ9
(28) — i = A - 2B Q ------  — 2 ------   _ b
1  °1 + 2Q1Q2 + °22
marginal marginal
revenue cost
Clearly, the overall optimum quantities in (15b) 
and (16b) will not cause this derivative to equal zero.
The marginal revenue part of (28) agrees with (15b) but 
the marginal cost part does not. Since the marginal 
cost term in (28) is larger than that in.(15b), reported 
marginal costs will equal marginal revenues at some quantity 
lower than the overall optimum quantity.
If common variable costs are not linear, average
cost will not equal marginal cost. Operating efficiency 
which varies at different levels of output will cause 
a curve of the form in equation (19) . If proportion 
factors based on usage are used to assign common costs, 
individual profit reports will be of the form:
(30a) tt2 - A2Q2 “ B2Q2 - q- j ff- [*>(Ql + Q2) “
Partial derivatives of reported product profits are
product quantities are such that the difference terms sum 
to a positive value, reported marginal cost is understated 
To maximize reported profits, the manager of product 1
(29b) — ^1^1 — ®1^1 "" kQ]_ + cQ^Q2-
— 2dQ^^Q2 — dQ-^Q^
(30b) ir2 = A2Q2 - B2Q2  ^ - bQ2 + cQiQ2 + cQ22 
- dQ12Q2 - 2dQ1Q22 - dQ23
- 4dQ1Q2 - 3dQ22
The marginal cost terms in equations (31) and
(21) differ in the amount (31a) 2dQ^Q2 + 2dQ22 - cQ2* When
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would produce some quantity greater than the overall 
optimum quantity. At low levels of output, the sum of the 
difference terms would be negative and reported marginal 
costs would be understated. The manager would be en­
couraged to over-produce. The opposite signs for the 
difference terms indicate that the average unit cost 
determined by the usage method may be higher or lower than 
marginal cost. Similarly, the difference between equations
(22) and (32) is 2dQ^2 + 2dQ1Q2 - cQ^ so that when average 
unit cost exceeds actual marginal cost, under-production is 
encouraged. Over-production is encouraged when average 
unit cost is less than actual marginal cost.
The relationship between average unit cost and 
marginal cost may be shown graphically by comparing the 
slopes of the average cost line and marginal cost at 
various levels of output. In Figure 6, the slope of the 
average cost line is greater than the slope of the cost 
curve at point A. The slope of the marginal cost line 
exceeds that of the average cost line at Point C. The two 
slopes are equal only at point B.
If total variable cost has no curvature (coeffi­
cients c and d equal to zero), or if the optimum level of 
output coincidentally happens to be where average unit 
cost equals marginal cost, the assignment of variable 
costs based on usage would not mislead managers. If 
neither of these conditions is satisfied, th<? difference 
between overall optimum quantities and the quantities which
maximize individual profit reports will be a function of 
curvature and volume distance between overall optimum 
output and the volume output at which average unit cost 
equals marginal cost.
Average cost 
Marginal cost 
Total cost
>VOLUME
Figure 6
Relationship Between Average 
Cost and Marginal' Cost
The profit stimulus toward overall optimum 
quantities should be of a nature which quickly leads the 
manager near the highest profit level. Managers may 
operate at sub-optimal levels for various reasons such as 
changes in demand, admission of a new product which uses 
the common facilities, of shifts in the common cost 
function due to changes in technology. When such changes 
occur, systems which quickly lead managers to near the new 
optimum profit level are preferable to systems which 
respond slowly to change.
It is clear from equations (21) and (22) that the 
intermediate product marginal cost attributable to each
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recipient is a function of the recipient's use and the 
use of all other recipients. This interrelationship be­
tween recipients can cause inconsistencies in cost 
behavior from the viewpoint of the individual product 
manager. If assignment of common variable cost is based 
on usage, the individual product profit reports based on 
equations (29) through (32) reflect some interrelation­
ship between recipients. This means that a change in 
product 2 output will cause cost assigned to product 1 
to change even if product 1 output is constant, if both 
product outputs change, the change in cost assigned on 
each profit report is based on both output changes.
It is possible that the two output changes could 
offset each other. Assume that the firm is currently 
operating at point B in Figure 6. If product 1 output is 
reduced, the manager of product 1 would reasonably expect 
the marginal cost of the intermediate product to decrease. 
However, if product 2 output increases enough to restore 
total intermediate output to level B, marginal cost and 
average cost will not change. This could lead the manager 
to expect straight-line cost behavior for future output 
changes. Assume that product 1 output and product 2 output 
increase simultaneously. The resulting increase in average 
unit cost and marginal cost for reporting purposes will be 
greater than if only product 1 output had increased. This 
profit report cost behavior could lead each manager to 
believe that common cost curvature is greater than it
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actually is. Each manager would change output slowly in 
the future believing that marginal cost is much more 
responsive to changes in his output than it actually is.
Equation (31) shows marginal revenue and cost 
from the viewpoint of product manager 1. The inter­
relationship between products for reporting purposes is 
due to the terms
(33) cQ2 - 4dQ1Q2 - dQ22
For manager 2, the interrelationship terms are
(34) cQ-l - dQx2 - 4dQ1Q2
Common cost curvature is due to the coefficients c and d.
As curvature increases, the interrelationship for reporting 
purposes and potential cost behavior inconsistencies in­
creases. As the coefficients c and d approach zero, common 
cost approaches a straight line. The interrelationship 
for reporting purposes will also approach zero and the 
final products will appear independent of each other for 
reporting purposes.
MARGINAL COST TRANSFER PRICING
Putney has developed a costing system in his 
dissertation which he refers to as flexible costing.22 
Assuming that the company is using the appropriate com-
32Putney, Frederick Bates. "Flexible Costing: A
Proposal For Unit Costing in the Multi-Product Case." Un­
published PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1968.
bination of inputs so that the current common cost function 
is based on maximum efficiency, Putney then discusses 
techniques for estimating coefficients b, c, and d.
Given a model of common cost behavior, one may then use 
partial derivatives to determine the marginal common cost 
attributable to each product at given levels of output.
For each reporting period, product managers would be given 
a report which indicated the marginal common cost attribu­
table to individual products.
As an example, assume common cost coefficients 
have been determined as follows:
(35) TVC = 10 (Qx + Q2) - KQ-l + Q2)2 + .1 (Qx + Q2)3 
Partial derivatives are
(36) 9TVC = 10 - 2Q, - 2Q2 + . 3QX2 + .60-^2+ .3Q22 
3 Q1
(37) 9TVC = 10 - 2Q2 - 2Q± + .30^ + .6Q.jQ2+ .3Q22
3 Q2
If current output for products 1 and 2 is 20 units 
and 10 units respectively, total variable cost is $2,100. 
Marginal common costs attributable to products 1 and 2 are 
$220 each. Note that the assumption that each unit of 
either product 1 or product 2 requires 1 unit of the 
common intermediate product causes marginal costs to be 
equal in this special case. Given this marginal cost, 
managers would increase the output of each product as long 
as net marginal revenue exceeds $220. As output changes, 
attributable marginal costs will also change. The match-
ing process continues until net marginal revenues of both 
products equal attributable marginal cost.
In a more general case, (35) would be modified to 
reflect differences in usage rates for the final products. 
If product 1 uses 1 unit of intermediate product per unit 
of output and product 2 uses 3 units of intermediate 
product per unit of output equation (35) would be modified 
as follows:
(35a) TVC = 10 (Q1 + 3Q2) - 1 (Qx + 3Q2)2 + .KC^ + 
3Q2>3
For product 1 and 2 outputs of 20 units and 10 units 
respectively, total variable cost would be $10,500. 
Marginal costs attributable to products 1 and 2 would be 
$840 and $2,520 respectively. One additional unit of 
product 2 would cost 3 times as much as an additional unit 
of product 1 because each product 2 unit requires 3 times 
as many intermediate product units. The process of ad­
justing outputs until the net marginal revenue of each 
final product equals its attributable marginal cost would 
still be followed to reach overall optimum quantities.
Putney's costing process provides marginal cost 
information to managers. The manager's goal is to equate 
net marginal revenues with attributable marginal cost.
An apparently logical extension would be to use attribu­
table marginal costs as transfer prices. If the trans­
fer price equals attributable marginal cost, then at 
optimum outputs, transfer prices will equal net marginal
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revenues so that the profit reports would show that a 
further increase in output would not increase reported 
profit. Using the above example with a transfer price of 
$840 per unit of intermediate product, a final product 
manager whose net marginal revenue is also $840 would have 
no profit incentive to change output as long as the trans­
fer price remains at $840.
If the common cost is linear, the transfer price 
would be b, the partial derivative of TVC. Product line 
statements would show a charge of bQ^. The statement forms 
would be identical to (23b) and (24b) for usage assignment. 
As we saw in (25b) and (26b), these statement forms will 
promote goal congruence in the linear common cost case.
There are two significant differences in the linear 
case between marginal cost transfer pricing and actual cost 
assignment based on usage. In real-life situations, actual 
common cost will fluctuate about the model cost line and 
may be higher or lower than the cost predicted by the 
model for a given time period. If actual cost is assigned 
based on usage, these random fluctuations will pass through 
to profit reports and may obscure expected cost behavior.
If a deterministic model of common cost behavior is 
developed, transfer prices will be based on normal cost- 
volume relationships. Cost deviations from the norm will 
not pass through to product profit reports.
Developing a cost model by regression analysis 
requires several observations of past behavior. If the
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common cost function changes and the old model is not 
updated, the transfer prices will be erroneous. Even if 
we know the underlying cost function has changed, several 
time periods must be observed before the model can be 
revised. Assignment of actual common cost based on 
usage avoids this danger. Actual common cost will be 
affected as soon as the underlying cost-volume relation­
ship changes and will automatically adjust to the new 
situation.
In the more general case which allows for common 
cost curvature, individual product profit reports would 
be of the forms:
(38a) 7r1 = A ^  - B ^ 2- (b - 2cQ1 - 2cQ2 + SdQ^
+ 6dQxQ2 + 3dQ22) Q 1 
or (38b) it1 = A1Q1 - - bQ^  ^+ 2cQ12 + 200.^
- SdC^3 - 6dQ12Q2 - 3dQ1Q22
(39a) tt2= A2Q2 - B2Q22 - (b - 2cQx - 2cQ2 + 3dQ12 
+ 6dQ^Q2 + 3dQ22) Q2  
or (39b) tt2 = A2Q2 - B2Q22 - bQ2 + 2 0 0 ^  + 2cQ22
- 3dQx2Q2 _ 6dQ22Q1-3dQ23
Taking derivatives of (38b) and (39b)
(40) = Ai " 2BiQi ’ b + 4cQi + 2cQ2 ” 9dQi2
- 12dQ1Q2 - 3dQ22 
37T2 _ * w ^ ^ 2
(41) = A 2 ~ 2b2Q 2 " b + 2cQ’ + 4cQ~ “ 3dQ
2
2- 12dQlQ2 - 9dQ2
58
The marginal cost terms in (40) and (41) differ 
from those in equations (21) and (22). Although the 
transfer price equals net marginal revenue at the optimum 
point, the transfer price itself is a function of output. 
Recipient divisions are now in a position to behave as 
monopsonist buyers. The marginal cost curve for the 
common cost center is viewed as a supply curve by 
recipient divisions. Unless marginal costs are constant as 
they were in the linear case, this supply curve will have 
some slope other than zero. This sloping supply curve is 
viewed by the monopsonist as an average cost curve in­
dicating the price he must pay for all units purchased 
at each quantity level. A change in the level of purchases 
will change the average price. The change in average 
price applies to all units purchased instead of just the 
change in units. The marginal cost or charge from the 
viewpoint of the buyer then differs from the supplier's 
marginal cost. If the supplier's marginal cost has a 
positive slope, marginal charges to the buyer will have a 
greater slope so that purchases will be smaller than those 
of a large group of competitive buyers.
Comparing the marginal cost terms of (40) to those 
of (21) , we find a difference of
(42) 6dQ^2 + 6dQ1Q2 - 200^ ^
and the difference between (41) and (22) is
(43) 6dQ22 + 6dQ1Q2 - 2cQ2
As in the usage assignment method, if quantities are high 
enough for (42) and (43) to sum to positive values, 
marginal cost for product profit reporting purposes are 
over-stated compared to supplier marginal cost. Managers 
attempting to maximize reported product profits would have 
an incentive to under-produce.
Comparing the difference terms in C42) with the
difference terms in (31a) reveals a common quantity term
®1®2* Coefficient 6d in (42) is three times as great as
that of Ola) . Further, if is approximately equal to
2
Q2 1 we can substitute for Qj in the 2 dQ2 term of 
(31a). The corresponding term in (42) would be 6dQ^ .
Again coefficient 6d is three times as great as that of 
(31a). Substituting in the final (31a) term yields 
cQ^. The corresponding term in (42) is 2cQ^, a term with 
twice the magnitude. Therefore, if and Q2 are near the 
same size, the difference between marginal cost for product 
profit reporting purposes and marginal cost to the com­
pany as a whole will be greater if marginal cost trans­
fer pricing is used than if cost assignment based on usage 
is employed. Comparison of equations (32a) and (43) leads 
to similar conclusions. Therefore, if usage assignment 
motivates under-production, we would expect marginal cost 
transfer pricing to motivate greater under-production.
In (33) and (34) , we examined the terms which show 
interrelationships between products and could cause profit 
report cost behavior inconsistencies. The interrelation­
ship terms for the linear case will be zero since the 
transfer price b is independent of output. For the more 
general case with curvature, these terms from the view­
point of managers 1 and 2 respectively are:
(44)2cQ2 - 12dQ1Q2 - 3dQ22
(45)2cQ1 - 12dQ1Q2 - 3dQx2
These interrelationship, terms are substantially higher 
than those in (33) and (34) . If consistencies in cost 
behavior because of the effect of one manager's output 
changes on the other manager's reported cost slow the 
process of reaching equilibrium when usage assignment is 
used, we would expect marginal cost transfer pricing to 
lead to greater confusion of managers in their attempt to 
maximize reported profit. We would expect a larger number 
of time periods required to reach an equilibrium as long 
as recipients rely solely on reported product profits as 
a guide to output decisions. This potential disadvantage 
of marginal cost transfer pricing may be partially offset 
in a real-life situation by the lack of random cost de­
viations passing through to profit reports. In addition, 
the intermediate product recipients may use the model 
supply curve as an aid in co-ordinating their mutual 
search for equilibrium outputs. Thus, as curvature ap­
proaches zero, the product profit reports approach in­
dependence .
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STANDARD COSTING
Standard costs exist in a variety of forms. Quite 
often, some normal volume is used to unitize fixed costs 
so that the resulting product costs charged to inventory 
or subsequent processing centers appear to be linear and 
fully variable in nature. We have already seen the error 
in using unitized fixed costs for output decisions.
In a variable costing system, only standard variable 
costs are charged to inventory. If the standard variable 
cost form allows for curvature, the primary effect is to 
prevent random fluctuations from established norms from 
passing through from a production center to inventory or 
to other production centers. If production-center output 
valued at standard variable cost with curvature is trans­
ferred to two or more recipient production-centers, total 
standard cost may be assigned based on recipient usage.
In this case, the goal congruence effect for the deter­
ministic model company would be identical to that of 
actual cost usage assignment since there are no random 
fluctuations from the norm in the model. Linear standard 
costing is used more often. The variable cost rate or 
standard unit cost may be derived from technical efficiency 
studies but is more often based on past performance within 
a relevant range of output. Determining the standard 
from past performance may be as simple as visually 
plotting a total standard cost line on a graph or the
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high-low method, or as relatively complex as regression 
analysis. For this paper, linear standard variable cost­
ing with the rate determined by a two point method ap­
plied to points at each output extreme point of the rele­
vant range will be assumed.
Product profit reports for both the linear and 
non-linear case will be of the form:
(46) TT1 = A1Q1 - B ^ 2 - STD x Q1
(47) it2 = A2Q2 - B2Q22 - STD x Q2
For the linear case, the standard variable unit cost, STD, 
should equal b in the basic cost model provided the 
method of determining STD is accurate and current. The
result will be identical to marginal cost transfer pric­
ing with price equal to b and will promote goal congruence.
For the non-linear case, STD may or may not 
closely approximate actual marginal cost at the overall 
optimum point. If STD equals MCq, managers maximizing 
reported profits will reach equilibrium at the proper 
quantity levels because unlike marginal cost transfer
pricing, STD is independent of the level of output. The
closeness between STD and MC0 will depend upon three
factors. First, STD will approach MC as curvatureo
approaches zero. Second, STD will approach MC as the
o
size of the relevant range is reduced. STD will also 
approach MCq as the relevant range used to estimate STD 
shifts along the entire output spectrum to center on MCq .
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These three factors are illustrated in Figure 7.
In panel A, it is clear that the slope of the standard cost 
line more closely approaches the slope of all points on the 
cost curve if the degree of curvature diminishes. Panel B 
shows that for a given amount of curvature, the standard 
cost line slope better approximates the slope of all points 
on the curve if the relevant range is narrow. Indeed, if 
the relevant range used to establish STD were infinitesi- 
mally small, the slope would be identical to the slope of 
the curve at the point within the range. If the relevant 
range covers some level far removed from the optimum point, 
the slope of STD will not approximate cost curve slope at 
optimum point 0 nearly as well as a relevant range which 
surrounds 0.
ACTUAL —
STD--
UNITS
B
UNITS
Figure 7
Relationship Between Standard 
Cost and Actual Cost
UNITS
For a non-linear cost such as in panel C, a 
relevant range below the optimum point 0 will cause STD 
to be less than MCQ thereby encouraging over-production.
Similarly, a relevant range too high will encourage 
under-production. If actual production is consistently 
above or below relevant range limits, the standard 
should be revised. The encouragement of the old 
standard toward over or under-production should be taken 
into account in selecting a new relevant range. Given 
an indication that a higher range is needed, management 
may decide to set the new relevant range somewhere 
between the old range and the new observations. Such 
dampening of the size of relevant range shifts should 
lead to a range which encompasses the optimum point 
after a very limited number of range shifts.
Use of a linear standard variable cost rate pre­
vents interrelationships between final products from 
being reflected in product profit reports because in 
the short run, the charge per unit of intermediate 
product remains constant. Therefore, managers should 
reach equilibrium outputs more quickly than they would 
with either marginal cost transfer pricing or usage 
assignment of actual cost.
MARKET VALUE ASSIGNMENT
The assignment of common variable costs based on 
net market value to the recipients is often used for 
joint products with fixed proportions. The reasoning 
behind this approach is that the level of output of the 
two or more co-products produced jointly is determined
by the net realizable value of the package of products.
If proportions are fixed, market value assignment avoids 
the problem of assigning costs to some products which 
are greater than net market value at the split-off 
point. The key characteristic of market value assign­
ment is that the costs of the common facility are 
assigned to final products based on the values of the 
benefits provided instead of a physical measure of 
benefit flows. In the case of joint products, fixed 
output proportions prohibit tracing the flow of input 
costs beyond the joint process. As long as output pro­
portions remain constant, an increase in output of one 
product necessitates a proportional increase in other 
products. Thus, the marginal input cost cannot be 
attributed to a single product. The increase in output 
is justified only if the sum of the market values at 
split-off is greater than the marginal input costs. It 
can be shown that this method results in the same per­
centage profit based on market values at split-off for 
all the joint products. From this, it follows that re­
ported profit for all the joint products will increase 
(decrease) with a change in total output if the sum of 
the incremental market values at split-off is greater 
(less) than the incremental common cost. This is the 
type of co-ordination between reported profits which would 
promote goal congruence in the fixed proportion case.
The more general manufacturing case is similar to
the joint product case in several respects. Common 
costs result from a production activity which provides a 
service or intermediate product to two or more recipient 
final products. Each final product has a net market 
value and the net market value curves will be different 
for each final product so that a marginal intermediate unit 
may have different values to different final products. 
Market value assignment explicitly recognizes this and 
could promote goal congruence for the same reason in the 
more general common cost case.
The general form of product profit reports if 
intermediate product costs are linear is:
(48) ^  = AlQl - BlQl
2
x (bQ^ + bQ2>
A1Q1 “ B1Q12 + a 2Q2 “ b 2Q22
x (bQ1 + bQ2)
Partial derivatives of the profit reports are
3ir
®2®2  ^ (A2bQ^ — 2B2bQ^Q2 + 2A2bQ2 ~ 
3B2bQ22) - (A2bQ1Q2“ B2bQ1Q22 - A2bQ22~
B2b Q2 )^ ^ 2  "" / ^1^1” ®1®1^
A 2Q2“ B 2®22)2
It is obvious that the overall quantities deter­
mined in (21) and (22) will not cause the profit report 
partial derivatives to equal zero. A very large number 
of interrelationship terms appear in (50) and (51).
Yet we determined earlier that the final products would 
be independent if intermediate product costs were linear. 
The partial derivatives of profit reports would contain 
a far greater number of interrelationship terms for the 
non-linear case. Because of the large number of terms in 
volved with different signs, we cannot predict if market 
value assignment will encourage over-production or under­
production. However, it is unlikely that market value 
assignment of intermediate product costs will lead to 
equilibrium outputs at overall optimum levels and that 
reaching an equilibrium level will be time consuming due 
to the large potential for irregular cost behavior in 
profit reports.
OTHER BASES FOR COST ASSIGNMENT
If the intermediate product is in the form of 
service instead of units of a physical product, common
costs may be assigned on the basis of direct labor hours, 
machine hours, transactions processed, etc. Such 
approaches are often used because of difficulties in 
relating these inputs to final product outputs. As an 
example, some variable personnel department costs may be 
closely related to direct labor hours. The relation­
ship between direct labor hours and final product output 
may change as the level of output changes so that total 
direct labor hours may have curvature when plotted against 
final product output. Therefore, the relationship be­
tween variable personnel department costs and direct 
labor hours may be simple while the relationship to final 
product output is much more complex. If a cause-effect 
relationship between the common indirect variable cost and 
some measurable input to the final production cost center 
exists, the common cost may be charged to final product 
divisions based on relative use of the input measure. 
Actual cost or standard cost could be assigned or 
marginal cost transfer pricing could apply to the inputs. 
If a valid cause-effect relationship exists, goal congru­
ence effects should be similar to those determined in 
preceding sections.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have mathematically analyzed 
the goal congruence characteristics of various methods 
of assigning common variable costs and the effect of
common cost curvature on these methods. As a result of 
this analysis, we made the following predictions assuming 
product managers attempt to maximize reported product 
profits.
1. If usage assignment of actual common cost 
is selected, equilibrium product outputs will approach 
overall optimum outputs as curvature of the common cost 
function approaches zero. If common costs are increasing 
at an increasing rate, (marginal costs greater than aver­
age unit costs), over-production will be encouraged.
2. Marginal cost transfer pricing will cause 
equilibrium outputs smaller than overall optimum outputs 
if common costs are increasing at an increasing rate when 
common cost curvature exists and equilibrium outputs will 
approach optimum outputs as common cost curvature ap­
proaches zero.
3. If standard costing is selected, the 
difference between equilibrium outputs and optimum outputs 
will decrease as curvature decreases, as the size of the 
relevant range decreases, and as the relevant range is 
systematically shifted to encompass the optimum output 
level.
4. If relevant range size and location are proper­
ly selected, standard costing should lead managers to 
equilibrium points the most quickly and the time required
to reach equilibrium will be independent of common cost
curvature.
5. Usage assignment of actual cost for a 
deterministic case will lead managers to an equilibrium 
quickly but the length of time required will tend to in­
crease as common cost curvature increases.
6. Marginal cost transfer pricing will lead 
managers to an equilibrium the least quickly if curvature 
exists and the length of time required will tend to in­
crease as common cost curvature increases.
7. Market value assignment of common variable 
costs is not likely to lead to optimum equilibrium outputs 
and will probably require the most time to reach an 
equilibrium.
In the next chapter, we will develop sets of 
model companies and rules for managerial response to 
changes in reported product profits. These rules will be 
used to simulate manager reactions to profit reports for 
model company sets in an effort to verify or reject the 
above conclusions from mathematical analysis.
Chapter 4 
CURVATURE AND MANAGERIAL DECISIONS
It has been shown in previous chapters that 
common variable cost curvature and cost assignment methods 
will affect product outputs. In this chapter, techniques 
will be developed for measuring and isolating curvature 
so that laboratory type tests can be used to demonstrate 
the effect of common cost curvature on goal congruence 
when the four basic cost assignment methods are used.
CURVATURE
Before testing the effects of curvature on the 
length of time required to reach equilibrium, curvature 
of the common cost function should be precisely defined. 
Mathematically, a curve is a collection of points whose 
coordinates are continuous functions of a single inde­
pendent variable. The straight line is a special case 
curve. The deviation from linearity may be measured 
in two ways. First, one may assume that an arc in ques­
tion is extended with the same degree of bending to form 
a circle. The amount of curvature may then be expressed 
as a radius of the circle. As the continuous bending 
of the curve becomes sharper, the circle size and radius 
decrease. Similarly, as the curve approaches a straight 
line, the radius will approach infinite length. The
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second measurement technique requires that the arc length 
be defined. This length may then be converted to radians 
"A radian is an angle which, if its vertex is placed at 
the center of a circle, subtends an arc equal in length 
to the radius of the circle."33 As a circle formed by 
extension of the arc becomes smaller, radian measure 
becomes larger because the defined arc length remains 
constant while the radius diminishes. As the curve 
approaches linearity, the radius approaches zero. Since 
common cost curvature may reasonably be expected to range 
from moderate curvature to linearity, radian measure will 
be used to avoid the problems of working with infinity.
To measure radians, the arc must be defined.
Since any assignment method which does not lead managers 
close to the optimum outputs is unacceptable, the arc 
should include the common cost curve point representing 
the number of intermediate units required for optimum 
outputs. If the arc length is overly short, the number 
of radians would be so small as to present computational 
and comparison difficulties. An overly long arc length 
also presents difficulties. Since the theoretical cost 
curve is S-shaped instead of circular, it would be pos­
sible to have equal slopes at the end points of the arc 
leading one to the infinite radius - zero radian con­
clusion even though the curve may deviate substantially
33E. Richard Heineman, PI erne Trigonometry (2nd ed 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), p. 47.
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from linearity between arc end points. After some 
experimentation, a linear length of ten intermediate 
units to either side of the optimum point was selected.
The procedure for measuring radians is illustrated 
in Figure 8. First, a straight line AB 20 intermediate 
product units in length is drawn tangent to the cost arc 
at optimum output 0 and centered about O. Step two would 
normally be to construct perpendiculars to line AB at end
COST
►2
INTERMEDIATE 
PRODUCT UNITS
Figure 8 
Measuring Radians
points A and B and determine the intersections of the 
perpendiculars with the arc. To simplify computations, 
vertical lines were extended from A and B to the arc. 
For small arc lengths and moderate to slight curvature, 
this simplification will not materially alter the
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measurement. Third, lin?s are drawn perpendicular to 
the slopes of the arc at : ntersections C and D forming 
angle W. The tangent of angle W is less than 1% different 
from the radian measure of the arc segment between C and 
D as long as angle W is 10 degrees or less. Thus, step 
four is determining the tangent of W. Geometrically, 
angle W equals angle X. Also, angle X equals angle Y 
minus angle Z. Therefore, tan W = tan X = (tan Y - 
tan Z)/(1 + tan Y tan Z). Because of the approximations 
used and the somewhat arbitrary linear length of the arc, 
the amount of curvature will be defined as the radian 
measure of a portion of the common cost curve centered 
about the optimum quantity with a linear length of 20 
intermediate product units as measured by the above 
technique.
ISOLATING THE EFFECT OF CURVATURE
Equilibrium attained by variable costing systems 
is affected by variables other than common cost function 
curvature. It is therefore necessary to devise tech­
niques which will prevent these variables from influenc­
ing simulated managerial quantity decisions during the 
testing of specific models.
All assignment methods will be affected by net 
revenue equation coefficients. Thus, it was decided 
to use sets of specific models for simulation testing.
A seed model gives a starting point to a computer
program developed to generate sets of specific model 
companies. This seed model input consists of coeffi­
cients Alf B]_, A2, B2, b, c, and d for model equation 
(20). Also, the assumption that both final products 
use one unit of intermediate product per unit of final 
product output will be dropped so the seed model also 
includes coefficients r and s as described in equation 
(8). The program determines optimum outputs for the 
two final products, company-wide potential profit at 
optimum outputs, and common cost curvature. The above 
data becomes specific model one in set one. Coeffi­
cients c and d which determine common cost curvature 
are then reduced by 5%. Coefficient b is adjusted so 
that the slope of the common cost curve remains the 
same as the previous optimum output level. This assures 
that optimum outputs will not change and therefore the 
curvature of the revenue functions will not change. 
Potential profit and common cost curvature are again 
computed. These computations and the coefficients be­
come model two in set one. Coefficients b, c, and d are 
adjusted again and computations performed to generate 
model three in set one. In this manner, 20 specific 
models are generated to form set one. A sample model 
set is presented in Table 1. Each of the 20 specific 
models within the set will have identical net revenue 
coefficients and optimum quantities. The absolute 
magnitude of potential profit will change due to changes
Table 1
Model Company Set 11
Radians
Revenue Coefficients Common Cost Coefficients
Optimum
Quantities Total 
Net Income 
Potential*1 B1 b2 B C , D S. S Qi Q2
.00013 75. .10 65. .15 8.0 .0100 .00040 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.7
U" " -- -i— L
$4,340.95
.00013 75. .10 65. .15 9.5 .0095 .00038 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.7 4,166.31
.00012 75. .10 65. .15 11.0 .0090 .00036 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.7 3,991.66
.00012 75. .10 65. .15 12.5 .0085 .00034 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.6 3,817.01
.00011 75. .10 65. .15 14.0 .0080 .00032 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.7 3,642.37
.00010 75. .10 65. .15 15.6 .0075 .00030 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.6 3,467.72
.00009 75. .10 65. .15 17.1 .0070 .00028 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.6 3,293.07
.00009 75. .10 65. .15 18.6 .0065 .00026 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.7 3,118.43
.00008 75. .10 65. .15 20.1 .0060 .00024 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.6 2,943.78
.00007 75. .10 65. .15 21.6 .0055 .00022 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.6 2,769.14
.00007 75. .10 65. .15 23.2 .0050 .00020 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.6 2,594.49
.00006 75. .10 65. .15 24.7 .0045 .00018 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.6 2,419.85
.00005 75. .10 65. .15 26.2 .0040 .00016 1.5 1.5 86.8 24.5 2,245.18
.00005 75. .10 65. .15 27.7 .0035 .00014 1.5 1.5 87.0 24.7 2,070.56
.00004 75. .10 65. .15 29.2 .0030 .00012 1.5 1.5 86.9 24.6 1,895.91
.00003 75. .10 65. .15 30.8 .0025 .00010 1.5 1.5 86.9 24.6 1,721.26
.00002 75. .10 65. .15 32.3 .0020 .00008 1.5 1.5 86.9 24.6 1,546.62
.00002 75. .10 65. .15 33.8 .0015 .00006 1.5 1.5 86.9 24.6 1,371.97
.00001 75. .10 65. .15 35.3 .0010 .00004 1.5 1.5 86.9 24.6 1,197.32
.00001 75. .10 65. .15 36.8 .0005 .00002 1.5 1.5 86.9 24.6 1,022.68
in common cost coefficients. However, the only change 
which should affect short run quantity decisions will 
be the changes in curvature resulting from cost co­
efficient changes. Twenty sets of specific models were 
generated for use in testing from the 20 seed companies 
listed in Appendix A. All model companies have been 
edited to eliminate those sets which have negative 
optimum outputs, a common cost which decreases in total 
as output increases over part of the possible range, or 
have an optimal output of 10 or fewer final product units.
As previously pointed out, the degree of closeness 
between optimum output and equilibrium output if stan­
dard costing is used depends upon common cost curvature, 
relevant range size, and relevant range location. Com­
mon cost will be computed for intermediate product output 
five percent above optimum and five percent below 
optimum. The slope of the straight line defined by 
these two points will be used as the standard unit cost. 
This procedure for determining standard cost will 
isolate the effects of curvature.
EQUILIBRIUM OUTPUT
Four programs were used to determine the outputs 
which maximize reported profit for two final products.
Each program assumes that for each specific model in the 
20 sets, managers will reach these outputs after some 
finite number of output adjustments. Flowcharts of all
programs are provided in Appendix B. Sample model set 
results are shown in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Table 2 clearly shows that as common cost curva­
ture in radians decreases, equilibrium output approaches 
optimum output for model set 11 and the percentage 
difference between potential profit and equilibrium 
profit also decreases when common variable costs are 
assigned based on usage. This tendency was observed 
for all 20 model sets. It was determined that marginal 
common cost exceeds average cost at optimum output for 
model set 11 and as predicted, production and consump­
tion of the intermediate product is excessive. Although 
product 1 is below optimal output at high curvature, 
product 2 is substantially in excess of optimal output 
so that intermediate product consumption is excessive. 
Excessive intermediate product consumption was observed 
for all 20 model sets.
Apparently, the use of a relatively narrow rele­
vant range centered about the optimum point in deter­
mining standard unit variable cost works quite well as 
the percentage difference between potential profit and 
equilibrium profit is so small that little correlation 
with curvature is apparent. This is illustrated in 
Table 3. The slight excess over potential profit in 
many cases in model set 11 is due to rounding differences 
between programs. For all 20 model sets, the percentage 
profit difference at relatively moderate to high curva­
ture is smallest when standard variable costing is used 
in preparing product profit reports compared to other 
methods tested.
Table 4 clearly shows that the percentage profit 
difference at equilibrium decreases as common cost 
curvature decreases and this trend was observed for all 
20 model sets when marginal cost transfer pricing is 
used. In addition, for models with moderate to high 
curvature, the percentage profit difference was consis­
tently larger than it was when either usage assignment 
or standard costing was used. Also, as predicted, 
consumption of the intermediate product is smaller than 
optimal consumption for model set 11. One product 
equilibrium quantity exceeded optimum quantity but this 
was more than offset by under-production of the other 
final product. In all 20 model sets, the amount of 
intermediate product used was less than optimal at 
the moderate to high rates of curvature.
In the analysis of common cost assignment based 
on relative market value, it was pointed out that the 
large number of terms in the derivatives of profit 
reports made specific predictions impossible. Table 5 
shows the relatively poor results obtained with this 
method. For some model sets, the percentage profit 
difference tends to decrease as common cost curvature 
increases. However, this tendency is not consistent 
and the percentage profit differences are relatively
Table 2
Comparison of Optimal and Equilibrium Outputs - Common 
Variable Costs Are Assigned Based on Usage
Model Company Set 11
Curvature 
In Radians
Product No. 1 Product No. 2
Optimum
Profit
Equilibrium
Profit
Percentage
Profit
DifferenceOptimumQuantity
Equilibrium
Quantity
Optimum
Quantity
Equilibrium
Quantity
.00013 87.0 84.9 24.7 50.7 $4,340.95 $3,977.49 8.4
.00013 87.0 84.5 24.7 50.4 4,166.31 3,835.74 7.9
.00012 87.0 84.4 24.6 50.1 3,991.66 3,688.25 7.6
.00012 87.0 85.1 24.6 49.4 3,817.01 3,536.46 7.4
.00011 87.0 85.0 24.7 48.9 3,642.37 3,391.20 6.9
.00010 87.0 85.8 24.6 48.0 3,467.72 3,218.75 7.2
.00009 87.0 85.8 24.6 47.8 3,293.07 3,062.46 7.0
.00009 87.0 85.9 24.7 47.3 3,118.43 2,913.45 6.6
.00008 87.0 86.6 24.6 46.2 2,943.78 2,765.96 6.0
.00007 87.0 86.5 24.6 45.0 2,769.14 2,626.48 5.2
.00007 87.0 86.9 24.6 44.3 2,594.49 2,450.26 5.6
.00006 87.0 87.5 24.6 43.4 2,419.85 2,296.17 5.1
.00005 86.8 88.0 24.5 43.2 2,245.18 2,133.21 5.0
.00005 87.0 88.5 24.7 41.4 2,070.56 1,988.00 4.0
.00004 86.9 89.7 24.6 40.6 1,895.91 1,826.09 3.7
.00003 86.9 88.2 24.6 39.1 1,721.26 1,663.06 3.4
.00003 86.9 90.4 24.6 37.2 1,546.62 1,503.69 2.8
.00002 86.9 89.6 24.6 35.6 1,371.97 1,348.75 1.7
.00001 86.9 91.2 24.6 32.6 1,197.32 1,190.80 .5
.00001 86.9 90.0 24.6 29.7 1,022.68 1,031.06 -.8
Table 3
Comparison of Optimal and Equilibrium Outputs - 
Common Variable Costs Are Assigned at Standard
Model Company Set 11
Curvature 
In Radians
Product No. 1 Product No. 2
Optimum
Profit
Equilibrium
Profit
Percentage
Profit
Difference
Optimum
Quantity
Equilibrium
Quantity
Optimum
Quantity
Equilibrium
Quantity
.00013 87.0 89.5 24.7 26.8 $4,340.95 $4,330.84 .2
.00013 87.0 90.4 24.7 26.2 4,166.31 4,158.80 .2
.00012 87.0 88.8 24.6 27.7 3,991.66 3,988.34 .1
.00012 87.0 89.0 24.6 27.1 3,817.01 3,819.26 -.1
.00011 87.0 88.7 24.7 26.6 3,642.37 3,650.96 -.2
.00010 87.0 87.7 24.6 27.4 3,467.72 3,463.05 .1
.00009 87.0 87.9 24.6 26.8 3,293.07 3,293.37 -.0
.00009 87.0 88.7 24.7 27.0 3,118.43 3,120.14 -.1
.00008 87.0 88.8 24.6 27.2 2,943.78 2,948.36 -.2
.00007 87.0 88.8 24.6 26.4 2,769.14 2,779.47 -.4
.00007 87.0 90.4 24.6 27.5 2,594.49 2,584.35 .4
.00006 87.0 87.9 24.6 26.9 2,419.85 2,420.76 -.0
.00005 86.8 91.2 24.5 27.6 2,245.18 2,240.73 .2
.00005 87.0 89.5 24.7 27.5 2,070.56 2,075.19 -.2
.00004 86.9 89.6 24.6 27.8 1,895.91 1,903.90 -.4
.00003 86.9 90.1 24.6 26.9 1,721.26 1,716.65 .3
.00003 86.9 89.3 24.6 25.8 1,546.62 1,648.53 -.1
.00002 86.9 86.8 24.6 26.9 1,371.97 1,377.90 -.4
.00001 86.9 90.1 24.6 25.6 1,197.32 1,206.03 -.7
.00001 86.9 89.4 24.6 27.0 1,022.68 1,034.95 -1.2
Table 4
Comparison of Optimal and Equilibrium 
Outputs - Transfer Prices Are Based 
on Marginal Cost at Actual Output
Model Company Set 11
Curvature 
In Radians
Product No. 1 Product No. 2
Optimum
Profit
Equilibrium
Profit
Percentage
Profit
DifferenceOptimum
Quantity
Equilibrium
Quantity
Optimum
Quantity
Equilibrium
Quantity
.00013 87.0 50.7 24.7 32.5 $4,340.95 $3,880.99 10.6
.00013 87.0 51.5 24.7 31.9 4,166.31 3,734.85 10.4
.00012 87.0 51.7 24.6 32.0 3,991.66 3,585.34 10.2
.00012 87.0 52.1 24.6 31.7 3,817.01 3,432.52 10.1
.00011 87.0 52.4 24.7 30.9 3,642.37 3,272.85 10.1
.00010 87.0 52.3 24.6 30.8 3.467.72 3,098.69 10.6
.00009 87.0 53.4 24.6 31.2 3,293.07 2,971.99 9.8
.00009 87.0 54.1 24.7 30.0 3,118.43 2,815.18 9.7
.00008 87.0 54.0 24.6 30.2 2,943.78 2,657.86 9.7
.00007 87.0 56.2 24.6 29.5 2,769.14 2,533.16 8.5
.00007 87.0 57.1 24.6 28.9 2,594.49 2,369.71 8.7
.00006 87.0 57.2 24.6 29.0 2,419.85 2,214.79 8.5
.00005 86.8 58.8 24.5 28.6 2,245.18 2,074.74 7.6
.00005 87.0 59.7 2h.l 27.6 2,070.56 1,918.58 7.3
.00004 86.9 61.2 24.6 26.7 1,895.91 1,771.20 6.6
.00003 86.9 61.8 24.6 26.5 1,721.26 1,602.26 6.9
.00003 86.9 65.3 24.6 25.6 1,546.62 1,467.00 5.1
.00002 86.9 67.7 24.6 24.9 1,371.97 1,317.82 3.9
.00001 86.9 72.4 24.6 23.8 1,197.32 1,174.52 1.9
.00001 86.9 78.1 24.6 25.3 1,022.68 1,025.80 -.3
Table 5
Comparison of Optimal and Equilibrium Outputs 
- Common Variable Costs Are Assigned 
Based on Relative Market Value
Model Company Set 11
Curvature 
In Radians
Product No. 1 Product No. 2
Optimum
Profit
Equilibrium
Profit
Percentage
Profit
Difference
Optimum
Quantity
Equilibrium
Quantity
Optimum
Quantity
Equilibrium
Quantity
.00013 87.0 80.4 24.7 58.8 $4,340.95 $3,809.64 12.2
.00013 87.0 79.8 24.7 59.1 4,166.31 3,659.72 12.2
.00012 87.0 80.5 24.6 58.6 3,991.66 3,512.02 12.0
.00012 87.0 80.4 24.6 58.3 3,817.01 3,369.57 11.7
.00011 87.0 80.4 24.7 58.0 3,642.37 3,226.20 11.4
.00010 87.0 80.4 24.6 57.9 3,467.72 3,052.29 12.0
.00009 87.0 81.7 24.6 58.0 3,293.07 2,873.14 12.8
.00009 87.0 82.8 24.7 56.9 3,118.43 2,733.62 12.3
.00008 87.0 81.3 24.6 57.8 2,943.78 2,578.40 12.4
.00007 87.0 82.8 24.6 57.4 2,769.14 2,415.23 12.8
.00007 87.0 81.9 24.6 56.8 2,594.49 2,268.59 12.6
.00006 87.0 83.9 24.6 56.5 2,419.85 2,098.62 13.3
.00005 86.8 84.2 24.5 56.2 2,245.18 1,950.15 13.1
.00005 87.0 85.2 24.7 55.8 2,070.56 1,798.30 13.1
.00004 86.9 85.2 24.6 54.7 1,895.91 1,666.63 12.1
.00003 86.9 86.6 24.6 55.6 1,721.26 1,469.46 14.6
.00003 86.9 87.2 24.6 55.3 1,546.62 1,322.03 14.5
.00002 86.9 87.7 24.6 54.2 ! 1,371.97 1,185.36 13.6
.00001 86.9 91.7 24.6 54.9 I 1,197.32 1,013.82 15.3
.00001 86.9 94.3 24.6 54.6 I 
1
1,022.68 867.87 15.1
large at all levels of curvature. The only conclusion 
justified is that relative market value basis common 
cost assignment is not generally satisfactory and should 
not be used if other methods are feasible.
DYNAMIC TESTING
A system which leads to equilibrium outputs most 
advantageous to the company as a whole is desirable but 
it is also desirable for the system to lead managers to 
an acceptable output quickly. It is possible that a 
system could lead managers to some acceptable sub- 
optimal level very quickly while a second system requires 
substantially more time to enter the acceptable range.
The first system could be more desirable even though 
the second system eventually reaches a better equilibrium 
because the second system must overcome the effect of 
lower profits during the early time periods. If future 
earning streams are discounted, the second system may 
not "catch up" at all.
REACTIONS TO PROFIT REPORTS
Very little research work has been done to estab­
lish how managers respond to product profit reports. It 
is reasonable to expect that managers have access to 
other sources of information and may consult with other 
managers to coordinate product outputs. Since the purpose 
of this paper is to isolate and evaluate the effect of
various common costing systems on goal congruence as 
common cost curvature changes, variables affecting out­
put decisions which are not directly related to the 
costing system will be held constant. Managers will be 
assumed to rely solely on product profit reports for 
information and will adjust output after each profit 
report in an effort to improve reported product profit.
The direction of a future product change can be 
specified from profit reports. If current net income 
for product X (NIX) is higher than previous income (PNIX), 
managers may reasonably assume the most recent change 
in output was in the proper direction. Conversely, if 
PNIX is higher than NIX, the most recent change in output 
was in the wrong direction. The logic of this decision 
process is flowcharted in Figure 9. INX in Figure 9 
represents the direction of the most recent change in 
output with value 0 representing a decrease and value 1 
representing an increase.
The decision diagram objectively specifies that 
an increment be either added or subtracted from current 
output based on the results of the two most recent pro­
duct profit reports. The size of the increment would 
normally be based on judgment and the results of all 
prior profit reports. The manager would evaluate profit 
at the levels of output produced in the past in an effort 
to estimate the most profitable output. In addition, he 
would rely on other sources of information to evaluate
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Decision Routine
market demand for his product. This decision process is 
most complex and cannot feasibly be diagramed. There­
fore, the size of the increment for testing purposes will 
be a constant percentage of optimum output. The test of 
the various systems will thus be limited to the question 
of will this system consistently lead managers in the 
proper direction. For testing purposes, the increment 
size will be 3% of optimum output for the final product 
with the largest optimum output and 5% of optimum output 
for the final product.
The difference in increment sizes is to help pre­
vent the two product outputs from moving together by
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identical percentage amounts during early time periods 
in the test. It was found that such lockstep movement 
tends to be reinforcing for the decision model used and 
substantially delays managers in reaching equilibrium.
As a further preventative measure, one product will be 
started in an increasing direction while the other 
product will be started in a decreasing direction. Each 
product will be started at some highly sub-optimal level 
and the effect of the decision rules applied to product 
profit reports will be listed for succeeding time periods.
Products will be started at levels far too high 
while evaluating usage assignment, relative market value 
assignment, and standard variable costing. Products will 
be started too low while evaluating marginal cost trans­
fer pricing. The reason for this difference is the clear 
tendency for equilibrium output to be lower than optimum 
when marginal cost transfer pricing is used. If the 
starting point is above optimum, output would quickly 
move toward the optimum level. The low increment size 
would cause output to remain in an acceptable range for 
several time periods even though output continues to 
decrease toward the lower equilibrium. If all methods 
were started at a low output, usage assignment would have 
this advantage because equilibrium output is above optimum 
for this method. Thus, the different starting points are 
required to allow some comparability. However, this com­
parability will not be complete. The starting profit may
be higher or lower because the profit when output is 50% 
too high will probably not equal profit when output is 
50% too low. Even if the starting profits were identi­
cal, the results would not be completely comparable be­
cause cost and revenue curves are not symmetrical about the 
optimum point and, therefore, curvatures experienced while 
on the path toward optimum output will not be equal. Be­
cause of these limitations on comparability, caution will 
be required in interpreting dynamic test results.
Figure 10 is a block diagram of the dynamic testing 
procedure. See Appendix B for a detailed flowchart of the 
test.
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Dynamic Testing Procedure
DYNAMIC TESTING RESULTS
The dynamic test was applied to all 20 model sets 
for the four basic costing systems studied. Test re­
sults for model set 11 are shown in Tables 6 through 14.
In the analysis of standard variable costing, it 
was observed that the interrelationship between product 
output changes is zero. A change in output of one pro­
duct will have no effect on the costs assigned to other 
products. In addition, standard variable costing repre­
sents common variable costs as a straight line function 
for product profit reporting purposes so that the charge 
per intermediate product unit used will remain constant. 
For these reasons, it was predicted that managers would 
move most quickly to equilibrium levels and the speed 
would not be affected by common cost curvature. These 
results are clearly evident in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 
shows that for each model within set 11, profits increase 
for each time period and quickly move very near to the 
optimum point after 12 time periods regardless of curva­
ture. Table 7 shows the path followed by each manager 
over 20 time periods for the model company with the great­
est curvature within model set 11. Even though product 2 
was started in the wrong direction, the decrease in 
product 2 reported profit caused the manager to reverse 
direction during time period one and to then consistently 
move toward an optimum level. Both products reach the 
optimum level by time period 15 and will oscillate about
Table 6
Dynamic Analysis of Optimal and Equilibrium Profits - 
Common Variable Costs Are Assigned at Standard
Model Company Set 11
Curvature 
in Radians
Percentage of Potential Profit Attained During Time Period
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 97 98 99 #10 #11 #12
.00013 70.7 75.5 79.8 83.6 87.0 90.0 92.6 94.7 96.5 97.9 98.9 99.6
.00013 71.0 75.7 79.9 83.8 87.2 90.1 92.7 94.8 96.6 98.0 99.0 99.3
.00012 71.4 76.1 80.3 84.1 87.4 90.3 92.9 95.0 96.7 98.1 99.1 99.7
.00012 71.7 76.3 80.5 84.3 87.6 90.5 93.0 95.1 96.9 98.2 99.2 99.6
.00011 71.8 76.4 80.6 84.4 87.7 90.6 93.1 95.2 96.9 98.3 99.3 99.6
.00010 71.6 76.2 80.3 84.1 87.4 90.3 92.7 94.8 96.6 97.9 98.9 99.5
.00009 71.9 76.5 80.6 84.3 87.6 90.4 92.9 95.0 96.7 98.0 99.0 99.4
.00009 72.1 76.7 80.8 84.4 87.7 90.6 93.0 95.1 96.8 98.1 99.1 99.8
.00008 72.7 77.2 81.2 84.8 88.0 90.8 93.3 95.3 97.0 98.3 99.3 99.9
.00007 73.2 77.6 81.6 85.1 88.3 91.1 93.5 95.5 97.2 98.5 99.4 99.8
.00007 72.8 77.1 81.1 84.6 87.8 90.6 92.9 95.0 96.6 97.9 98.9 99.5
.00006 73.3 77.6 81.5 85.0 88.1 90.8 93.2 95.2 96.8 98.1 99.0 99.6
.00005 74.4 78.6 82.3 85.7 88.7 91.4 93.6 95.6 97.1 98.4 99.3 99.8
.00005 74.5 78.6 82.4 85.8 88.8 91.4 93.7 95.6 97.2 98.5 99.4 100.0
.00004 75.6 79.6 83.3 86.5 89.4 92.0 94.2 96.0 97.6 98.8 99.6 100.2
.00003 75.2 79.2 82.7 85.9 88.8 91.3 93.4 95.3 96.8 98.0 98.9 99.4
.00003 76.3 80.1 83.5 86.6 89.3 91.7 93.8 95.6 97.1 98.2 99.1 99.5
.00002 77.7 81.2 84.5 87.4 90.0 92.3 94.3 96.0 97.4 87.5 99.4 99.9
.00001 79.4 82.7 85.8 88.5 91.0 93.1 95.0 96.6 97.9 98.9 99.7 100.2
.00001 81.8 84.8 87.5 90.0 92.2 94.2 95.9 97.3 98.5 99.5 100.2 100.7
Table 7
Dynamic Path Followed - Common Variable 
Costs Are Assigned at Standard
Model Company Set 11
Time Product No 1 Product No. 2
Period Quantity 
Optimum Actual Reported Profit
Quantity 
Optimum Actual Reported Profit
-1 87.0 130.5 $ 574.57 24.7 35.8 $ 74.52
0 87.0 126.1 610.00 24.7 37.0 70.00
1 87.0 123.5 629.00 24.7 35.8 74.00
2 87.0 120.9 648.00 24.7 34.7 78.00
3 87.0 118.3 665.0 24.7 33.3 81.00
4 87.0 115.7 680.00 24.7 32.1 84.00
5 87.0 113.1 694.00 24.7 30.9 87.00
6 87.0 110.5 707.00 24.7 29.6 89.00
7 87.0 107.9 719.00 24.7 28.4 90.00
8 87.0 105.3 729.00 24.7 27.2 91.00
9 87.0 102.7 737.00 24.7 25.9 92.00
10 87.0 100.0 745.00 24.7 24.7 92.00
11 87.0 97.4 751.00 24.7 23.5 92.00
12 87.0 94.8 755.00 24.7 22.2 91.00
13 87.0 92.2 759.00 24.7 23.5 92.00
14 87.0 89.6 760.00 24.7 24.7 92.00
15 87.0 87.0 761.00 24.7 25.9 92.00
16 87.0 84.4 760.00 24.7 27.2 91.00
17 87.0 87.0 761.00 24.7 25.9 92.00
18 87.0 89.6 760.00 24.7 24.7 92.00
19 87.0 87.0 761.00 24.7 23.5 92.00
20 87.0 84.4 760.00 24.7 22.2 91.00
that level for all future time periods. The oscilla­
tions are due to the model requirement that output be 
adjusted by an increment after each profit report. For 
all 20 model sets, quantities moved to the optimum level 
as quickly as the model constraints and starting point 
permitted.
Table 8 shows that marginal cost transfer pric­
ing is sensitive to curvature. It may be noted that a 
higher percentage of potential profit is attained than 
with standard variable costing during the first three 
time periods for model set 11. An investigation revealed 
that for set 11, the starting point itself was responsible 
for this profit difference. Table 9 reveals that the 
changes in quantities were a mirror image of the quantity 
changes when standard variable costing was used during 
the first three time periods. During time period four, 
the product one output change reverses direction. By 
time period eight, outputs of both products are near 
equilibrium and will continue to oscillate about this 
sub-optimal level. Although marginal cost transfer pric­
ing also leads managers toward optimum outputs as rapidly 
as the model constraints permit, the equilibrium output 
is far from optimal. Thus, the curvature effect observed 
in Table 8 is an equilibrium result instead of a result 
of not moving consistently toward equilibrium.
A change in product one output will cause a change 
in the transfer price charged to both products. In
Table 8
Dynamic Analysis of Optimal and Equilibrium 
Profits - Transfer Prices Are Based on 
Marginal Cost at Actual Output
Model Company Set 11
Curvature 
in Radians
Percentage of Potential Profit Attained During Time Period
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12
.00013 77.3 80.5 83.6 82.3 85.2 84.0 86.8 84.0 81.1 77.9 81.1 84.0
.00013 77.4 80.6 83.7 82.4 85.3 82.4 79.3 77.9 81.1 84.1 81.1 77.9
.00012 77.4 80.7 83.7 82.5 85.4 84.1 86.9 84.1 81.2 78.0 81.2 84.1
.00012 77.5 80.8 83.8 82.6 85.5 84.2 87.0 84.2 81.3 78.1 81.3 84.2
.00011 77.7 80.9 84.0 82.7 85.6 84.4 87.1 84.4 81.4 78.2 81.4 84.4
.00010 77.5 80.7 83.7 82.5 85.4 84.1 86.8 84.1 81.2 78.0 81.2 84.1
.00009 77.7 80.9 83.9 82.6 85.5 84.2 86.9 84.2 81.3 78.1 81.3 84.2
.00009 77.9 81.1 84.0 82.8 85.6 84.4 87.1 84.4 81.4 78.3 81.4 84.4
.00008 78.0 81.2 84.2 82.9 85.7 84.4 87.2 84.4 81.5 78.4 81.5 84.4
.00007 78.2 81.4 84.3 83.0 85.9 84.6 87.3 84.6 81.7 83.0 85.9 84.6
.00007 78.0 81.2 84.1 86.8 85.6 88.2 85.6 82.8 81.4 84.3 87.0 84.3
.00006 78.2 81.4 84.3 87.0 85.8 88.3 85.8 83.0 81.6 84.5 87.1 84.5
.00005 78.4 81.5 84.4 87.1 85.8 88.4 85.8 83.1 85.8 88.4 85.8 83.1
.00005 78.8 81.9 84.8 87.5 86.2 88.8 86.2 83.5 86.2 88.8 86.2 83.5
.00004 79.1 82.2 85.0 87.7 90.1 87.7 85.0 87.7 90.1 87.7 85.0 87.7
.00003 79.0 82.0 84.8 87.4 89.8 88.6 90.8 88.6 86.1 87.4 89.8 88.6
.00003 79.4 82.4 85.2 87.7 90.1 92.2 90.1 87.7 90.1 92.2 90.1 87.7
.00002 80.0 82.9 85.7 88.2 90.5 92.5 93.5 95.3 93.5 91.6 89.4 91.6
.00001 80.7 83.6 86.3 88.8 91.0 93.0 94.8 95.7 97.2 95.7 94.0 92.1
.00001 81.7 84.6 87.1 89.5 91.7 93.6 95.3 96.8 98.1 98.9 99.8 98.9
Table 9
Dynamic Path Followed - Transfer Prices Are 
Based on Marginal Cost at Actual Output
Model Company Set 11
Time Product No . 1 Product No. 2
Period Quantity 
Optimum Actual Reported Profit
Quantity 
Optimum Actual Reported Profit
-1 87.0 43.5 $2,088.92 24.7 13.6 $ 547.93
0 87.0 47.8 2,212.00 24.7 12.3 483.00
1 87.0 50.5 2,231.00 24.7 13.6 505.00
2 87.0 53.1 2,233.00 24.7 14.8 521.00
3 87.0 55.7 2,217.00 24.7 16.1 529.00
4 87.0 53.1 2,165.00 24.7 17.3 579.00
5 87.0 55.7 2,142.00 24.7 18.5 579.00
6 87.0 53.1 2,095.00 24.7 19.8 628.00
7 87.0 55.7 2,064.00 24.7 21.0 619.00
8 87.0 53.1 2,095.00 24.7 19.8 628.00
9 87.0 50.5 2,108.00 24.7 18.5 630.00
10 87.0 47.8 2,103.00 24.7 17.3 625.00
11 87.0 50.5 2,108.00 24.7 18.5 630.00
12 87.0 53.1 2,095.00 24.7 19.8 628.00
13 87.0 50.5 2,108.00 24.7 18.5 630.00
14 87.0 47.8 2,103.00 24.7 17.3 625.00
15 87.0 50.5 2,108.00 24.7 18.5 630.00
16 87.0 53.1 2,095.00 24.7 19.8 628.00
17 87.0 50.5 2,108.00 24.7 18.5 630.00
18 87.0 47.8 2,103.00 24.7 17.3 625.00
19 87.0 50.5 2,108.00 24.7 18.5 630.00
20 87.0 53.1 2,095.00 24.7 19.8 628.00
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Chapter 3, it was predicted that managers would not move 
as quickly toward equilibrium levels as Table 8 shows due 
to this interrelationship between outputs. This pre­
diction is not supported by the test results. The 
different signs in equations (42) and (43) may cause 
the values of the interrelationship terms to largely 
offset each other so that the net effect is not as strong 
as other factors which affect reported profit. If this 
is correct, the problem posed by the interrelationship 
terms is only a potential one and will not normally affect 
the time required to reach equilibrium.
Table 10 reveals that total profit increases 
during the 12 time periods allowed when common variable 
costs are assigned based on usage and this method is 
sensitive to curvature. Tables 8 and 10 show little 
difference in results between usage assignment and marginal 
cost transfer pricing. However, Table 11 shows that 
product 2 quantities continued to increase and thereby 
move away from optimum product 2 output for the first 
14 time periods. The profit reports for product 2 en­
courage this movement. Also, note that product 1 quantity 
continues to decrease below optimum product 1 output.
From Table 2, we know that usage assignment will lead 
both managers near the optimum quantity at equilibrium.
This suggests that more time will be required to reach 
equilibrium than is the case if either standard variable 
costing or marginal cost transfer pricing is used.
Table 10
Dynamic Analysis of Optimal and Equilibrium Profits - 
Common Variable Costs Are Assigned Based on Usage
Model Company Set 11
Curvature 
in Radians
Percentage of Potential Profit Attained During Time Period
#1 02 #3 #4 #5 06 #7 08 09 010 011 012
.00013 67.6 69.6 71.4 73.2 74.9 76.4 77.9 79.3 80.6 81.8 82.9 83.9
.00013 67.8 69.8 71.7 73.4 75.1 76.6 78.1 79.5 80.8 82.0 83.0 84.0
.00012 68.3 70.3 72.1 73.9 75.5 77.1 78.5 79.9 81.2 82.3 83.4 84.4
.00012 68.6 70.6 72.4 74.2 75.8 88.3 78.8 80.1 81.4 82.5 83.6 84.5
.00011 68.8 70.7 72.5 74.3 75.9 77.4 78.8 80.2 81.4 82.5 83.6 84.5
.00010 68.6 70.5 72.4 74.1 75.7 77.3 78.7 80.0 81.2 82.3 83.3 84.3
.00009 69.0 70.9 72.7 74.4 76.1 77.6 79.0 80.3 81.5 82.6 83.5 84.4
.00009 69.2 71.1 72.9 74.6 76.2 77.7 79.1 80.4 81.5 82.6 83.6 84.4
.00008 69.8 71.7 73.5 75.2 76.8 78.3 79.6 80.9 82.0 83.1 84.0 84.8
.00007 70.3 72.2 74.0 75.7 77.2 78.7 80.0 81.3 82.4 83.4 84.3 85.1
.00007 70.0 71.9 73.6 75.3 76.9 78.3 79.6 80.8 81.9 82.9 83.7 84.5
.00006 70.6 72.4 74.2 75.8 77.4 78.8 80.1 81.2 82.3 83.2 84.0 84.7
.00005 71.8 73.6 75.3 76.9 78.4 79.8 81.0 82.1 83.1 84.0 84.7 85.4
.00005 71.9 73.7 75.4 77.0 78.5 79.8 81.0 82.1 83.0 83.9 84.6 85.2
.00004 73.1 75.0 76.6 78.2 79.6 80.9 82.0 83.1 84.0 84.7 85.3 85.8
.00003 72.9 74.7 76.3 77.9 79.2 80.5 81.6 82.5 83.4 84.1 84.6 85.0
.00003 74.1 75.9 77.5 79.0 80.3 81.5 82.5 83.4 84.1 84.7 85.2 85.5
.00002 75.6 77.4 78.9 80.4 81.6 82.7 85.8 88.6 91.0 93.2 95.0 96.6
.00001 77.6 81.1 84.3 87.2 89.9 82.2 94.2 96.0 97.4 98.6 99.5 100.2
.00001 81.8 84.8 87.5 90.0 92.2 94.2 95.9 97.3 98.5 99.5 100.2 100.7
Table 11
Dynamic Path Followed - Common Variable 
Costs Are Assigned Based on Usage
Model Company Set 11
Time
Period
Product No. 1 Product No. 2
Quantity 
Optimum Actual Reported Profit
Quantity 
Optimum Actual Reported Profit
-1 87.0 130.5 $2,133.70 24.7 35.8 $ 502.41
0 87.0 126.1 2,283.00 24.7 37.0 561.00
1 87.0 123.5 2,339.00 24.7 38.3 595.00
2 87.0 120.9 2,389.00 24.7 39.5 629.00
3 87.0 118.3 2,435.00 24.7 40.8 664.00
4 87.0 115.7 2,476.00 24.7 42.0 700.00
5 87.0 113.1 2,512.00 24.7 43.2 736.00
6 87.0 110.5 2,543.00 24.7 44.5 773.00
7 87.0 107.9 2,570.00 24.7 45.7 811.00
8 87.0 105.3 2,592.00 24.7 46.9 850.00
9 87.0 102.7 2,609.00 24.7 48.2 889.00
10 87.0 100.0 2,621.00 24.7 49.4 928.00
11 87.0 97.4 2,629.00 24.7 50.6 968.00
12 87.0 94.8 2,632.00 24.7 51.9 1,009.00
13 87.0 92.2 2,631.00 24.7 53.1 1,051.00
14 87.0 94.8 2,544.00 24.7 54.3 987.00
15 87.0 92*2 2,631.00 24.7 53.1 1,051.00
16 87.0 89.6 2,706.00 24.7 51.9 1,109.00
17 87.0 87.0 2,768.00 24.7 50.6 1,160.00
18 87.0 84.4 2,819.00 24.7 49.4 1,207.00
19 87.0 81.8 2,858.00 24.7 48.2 1,247.00
20 87.0 79.2 2,886.00 24.7 46.9 1,282.00
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Table 12
Dynamic Path Followed - Common Variable 
Costs Are Assigned Based on Usage
Model Company Set 6
Product No. 1 Product No. 2
Quantity 
Optimum Actual
Reported Profit
Quantity 
Optimum Actual
Reported Profit
252.0 378.0 $2,655.09 52.4 76.0 $ 671.22
252.0 365.4 2,781.00 52.4 78.6 693.00
252.0 357.8 2,830.00 52.4 81.2 694.00
252.0 350.3 2,874.00 52.4 83.8 693.00
252.0 342.7 3,009.00 52.4 81.2 758.00
252.0 335.2 3,132.00 52.4 78.6 817.00
252.0 327.6 3,245.00 52.4 76.0 868.00
252.0 320.0 3,346.00 52.4 73.4 912.00
252.0 312.5 3,438.00 52.4 70.7 950.00
252.0 304.9 3,518.00 52.4 68.1 980.00
252.0 297.4 3,589.00 52.4 65.5 1,005.00
252.0 289.8 3,649.00 52.4 62.9 1,023.00
252.0 282.2 3,700.00 52.4 60.3 1,034.00
252.0 274.7 3,741.00 52.4 57.6 1,040.00
252.0 267.1 3,772.00 52.4 55.0 1,040.00
252.0 259.6 3,793.00 52.4 52.4 1,035.00
252.0 252.0 3,758.00 52.4 55.0 1,071.00
252.0 259.6 3,742.00 52.4 57.6 1,074.00
252.0 252.0 3,709.00 52.4 60.3 1,106.00
252.0 259.6 3,690.00 52.4 62.9 1,100.00
252.0 252.0 3,709.00 52.4 60.3 1,106.00
252.0 244.4 3,718.00 52.4 57.6 1,107.00
\D
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Apparently the changes in product 1 output are affecting 
the common cost assigned to product 2 to an extent great 
enough to cause product 2 reported profits to increase 
even though the quantity change is in the wrong direction.
This effect is much more pronounced for set 11,
model 1 than for other model sets. Testing results for
set 6, model 1 are more typical and are reproduced as 
Table 12. For set 6, the manager is misled for two 
time periods and is subsequently led in the proper direc­
tion. For 15 of the 20 model sets, managers were misled 
for the first two time periods or less and were misled
for a larger number of time periods for 5 of the model
sets. Thus, the potential for reporting interrelation­
ships misleading product managers clearly exists when 
common variable costs are assigned based on usage.
Dynamic testing results for relative market value 
cost assignment are shown in Tables 13 and 14 for model 
set 11. Although the percentage of potential profit 
attained by time period 12 is reasonably close to that 
attained by usage assignment and marginal cost transfer 
pricing at moderate to high curvature, product manager 2 
is misled for more than two time periods for 7 of the 20 
model sets. Thus, the interrelationship terms do have 
the potential to delay managers in reaching equilibrium.
Table 13
Dynamic Analysis of Optimal and Equilibrium Profits 
- Common Variable Costs Are Assigned 
Based on Relative Market Value
Model Company Set 11
Curvature 
in Radians
Percentage of Potential Profit Attained During Time Period
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 # 6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12
.00013 67.6 69.6 71.4 73.2 74.9 76.4 77.9 79.3 80.6 81.8 82.9 83.9
.00013 67.8 69.8 71.7 73.4 75.1 76.6 78.1 79.5 80.8 82.0 83.0 79.3
.00012 68.3 70.3 72.1 73.9 75.5 77.1 78.5 79.9 81.2 82.3 83.4 79.7
.00012 68.6 70.6 62.4 74.2 75.8 77.3 78.8 80.1 81.4 82.5 83.6 79.9
.00011 68.8 70.7 72.5 74.3 75.9 77.4 78.8 80.2 81.4 82.5 83.6 79.9
.00010 68.6 70.5 72.4 74.1 75.7 77.3 78.7 80.0 81.2 82.3 83.3 79.7
.00009 69.0 70.9 72.7 74.4 76.1 77.6 79.0 80.3 81.5 82.6 83.5 79.9
.00009 69.2 71.1 72.9 74.6 76.2 77.7 79.1 80.4 81.5 82.6 83.6 79.9
.00008 69.8 71.7 73.5 75.2 76.8 78.3 79.6 80.9 82.0 83.1 84.0 80.5
.00007 70.3 72.2 74.0 75.7 77.2 78.7 80.0 81.3 82.4 83.4 79.7 83.4
.00007 70.0 71.9 73.6 75.3 76.9 78.3 79.6 80.8 81.9 82.9 79.3 82.9
.00006 70.6 72.4 74.2 75.8 77.4 78.8 80.1 81.2 82.3 83.2 79.7 83.2
.00005 71.8 73.6 75.3 76.9 78.4 79.8 81.0 82.1 83.1 79.5 83.1 86.3
.00005 71.9 73.7 75.4 77.0 78.5 79.8 81.0 82.1 83.0 79.5 83.0 86.2
.00004 73.1 75.0 76.6 78.2 79.6 80.9 82.0 83.1 84.0 80.5 84.0 87.0
.00003 72.9 74.7 76.3 77.9 79.2 80.5 81.6 82.5 83.4 80.0 83.4 86.4
.00003 74.1 75.9 77.5 79.0 80.3 81.5 82.5 83.4 80.0 83.4 86.4 89.0
.00002 75.6 77.4 78.9 80.4 81.6 82.7 83.7 84.4 81.3 84.4 87.3 89.8
.00001 77.6 79.3 80.8 82.1 83.3 84.3 85.1 82.1 85.1 87.9 90.3 92.5
.00001 80.3 81.9 83.3 84.6 85,6 86.5 83.7 86.7 89.0 91.3 93.3 95.1
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Table 14
Dynamic Path Followed - Common Variable Costs 
Are Assigned Based on Relative Market Value
Model Company Set 11
Product No. 1
Quantity 
Optimum Actual Reported Profit
Product No. 1
Quantity' 
Optimum Actual Reported Profit
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
87.0
130.5 
126.1
123.5
120.9
118.3
115.7 
113.1
110.5
107.9
105.3
102.7 
100.0
97.4
94.8
97.4
94.8
92.2 
89.6 
87.0
84.4
81.8
79.2
$2,085.27
2,222.00
2.269.00
2.310.00
2.346.00
2.378.00
2.404.00
2.427.00
2.444.00
2.457.00
2.465.00
2.469.00
2.469.00
2.465.00
2.360.00
2.465.00
2.556.00
2.635.00
2.702.00
2.757.00
2.799.00
2.831.00
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
24.7
35.8
37.0
38.3
39.5
40.8
42.0
43.2
44.5 
45.7
46.9
48.2
49.4
50.6
51.9
53.1
51.9
50.6
49.4
48.2
46.9
45.7
44.5
$ 550.84 
622.00
665.00
708.00
753.00
798.00
844.00
890.00
937.00
984.00
1.032.00
1.080.00 
1,128.00
1.177.00
1.124.00
1.177.00
1.225.00
1.267.00
1.303.00
1.335.00
1.361.00
1.382.00
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CONCLUSIONS
Standard variable costing will lead managers as 
quickly as possible to an equilibrium output regardless 
of curvature. This equilibrium output will be near the 
optimum output if the relevant range is small and is 
centered about the optimum point. Sensitivity to curva­
ture was much less than expected making this method less 
sensitive to curvature than usage assignment or marginal 
cost transfer pricing given the conditions of the tests.
The testing reveals that product profit reports 
prepared with common variable costs assigned based on 
intermediate product usage will lead managers to over­
produce when curvature is material and to approach 
optimum outputs as curvature approaches zero. The tests 
also demonstrated that interrelationship terms may cause 
some inconsistency in movement toward equilibrium at high 
curvature.
It was demonstrated that marginal cost transfer 
pricing will lead managers to under-produce when curva­
ture is material and to approach optimum outputs as 
curvature approaches zero. The prediction of inconsis­
tency in output changes while moving toward equilibrium 
was not supported by the tests. The dynamic test was re­
run with starting points far above optimum outputs and 
managers were then misled for the first time period only 
for 3 of the 20 model sets and were not misled at all for 
the other 17 sets. Thus, there were no sustained in-
consistencies in output changes which would materially 
delay reaching equilibrium. The percentages of profit 
attained during each of the first 12 time periods are 
very close to those attained when usage assignment was 
tested. Because of the limited comparability due to 
the lack of prof it symmetry about the optimum points, 
no conclusion is offered as to the relative quickness 
of these two methods in reaching equilibrium outputs.
The only prediction made for relative market 
value basis cost assignment was that the results would be 
poor. While test results were not substantially worse 
than those attained with usage assignment or marginal 
cost transfer pricing at high curvature, test results 
were much worse at moderate to low curvature thereby 
justifying the conclusion that this method is the least 
desirable of the four methods studied.
Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
Standard variable costing is the most desirable 
of the four methods studied. Several empirical studies 
have shown that cost function curvature for a variety 
of industries and processes is not significantly greater 
than zero. At zero curvature/ it was shown mathemati­
cally that both standard variable costing and marginal 
cost transfer pricing provide identical results because 
marginal cost is constant at all levels of output. Both 
methods prevent random cost variations from influencing 
product profit reports. Usage assignment provides iden­
tical results for the deterministic case but, if random 
cost variations occur, false profit signals could 
potentially be provided to managers which would lengthen 
the time required to reach equilibrium. Therefore, 
standard variable costing is potentially superior to 
usage assignment and is identical to marginal cost 
transfer pricing.
As curvature increases, standard variable cost­
ing properly applied is clearly superior to other methods. 
Relative market value allocation is unpredictable in 
behavior. Since the marginal cost transfer price is 
an average price charged for all intermediate product 
input, a limited number of buyers will act as monop-
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sonists and can achieve highest reported profits for 
their products by using less than the optimum quantity 
of intermediate product. It was shown mathematically 
and demonstrated that this bias toward under-production 
will increase as common cost curvature increases. It 
was also shown that usage assignment is based on average 
unit costs and this average does not increase as rapidly 
as does marginal cost. Therefore, when marginal costs 
are increasing, usage assignment is biased toward over­
production. It was shown mathematically and demonstrated 
that this over-production bias increases as common cost 
curvature increases. Over or under-production bias does 
not exist when standard variable costing is properly 
used. If the relevant range used to derive standard unit 
cost is above the optimum quantity, standard unit cost 
will be too high and managers will have a profit incen­
tive to reduce output. If the standard remains unchanged, 
managers would be led to under-production. However, the 
output reduction itself signals that the relevant range 
is too high and should be lowered. Similarly, a rele­
vant range too low will stimulate increased output which 
signals that the range should be raised. If the rele­
vant range is adjusted whenever actual production is 
consistently outside range limits, the range should center 
itself about the optimum quantity. It was demonstrated 
that if a relatively narrow relevant range is centered 
about the optimum quantity, common cost curvature will
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have little or no effect on the results attained and 
goal congruence will be achieved.
It was also demonstrated and shown mathematically 
that at slight to moderate curvature, common variable 
costing leads managers toward equilibrium quantities 
as rapidly as the model parameters permitted. There­
fore, common variable costing is equal to or superior to 
other methods in minimizing the time required to reach 
optimum output levels.
Because of the limited number of parameters, 
usage assignment is the simplest and therefore the least 
costly system to implement and operate and would be 
followed closely by relative market value allocation.
Standard variable costing would be slightly more com­
plex and in addition, would require some observation time 
periods to provide a basis for determining relevant range 
and standard unit cost. Marginal cost transfer pricing 
would be the most complex system to implement and operate 
and would require a greater number of observation time 
periods initially because of the greater number of 
parameters which must be estimated. Cost of use and 
implementation is the only area in which standard 
variable costing is not as desirable or more desirable 
than other systems examined. This disadvantage is con­
sidered to be of little significance since many firms 
currently find that some form of standard costing pro­
vides controls and other benefits which justify the higher
costs before goal congruence is even considered.
The quantitative analysis work in this paper and 
the laboratory type demonstrations have shown that for 
classical economic S-shaped common cost behavior with 
limited curvature, common variable costing systems 
properly used meet goal congruence criteria better than 
other commonly used methods and perform at least as well 
as other methods for straight line common cost behavior.
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APPENDIX A
DEVELOPING MODEL 
COMPANY SETS
Table 15
List of Seed Models for Model 
Generating Program
Model A1 Bi A2 B2
B C D R S
1 25. .03 50. .15 4.0 .0010 .00010 .5 2.0
2 75. .75 65. .90 5.0 .0008 .00008 2.0 2.0
3 25. .03 50. .15 4.0 .0015 .00017 .5 1.5
4 75. .75 65. .90 5.0 .0012 .00015 2.0 2.0
5 30. .04 40. .10 5.0 .0008 .00010 .5 1.5
6 30. .04 40. .10 5.0 .0010 .00012 .5 1.5
7 75. .10 65. .15 10.0 .0010 .00020 1.5 1.5
8 75. .10 65. .15 10.0 .0030 .00040 1.5 1.5
9 90. .80 70. .60 12.0 .0010 .00015 2.0 2.5
10 40. .25 30. .15 10.0 .0020 .00040 1.0 .5
11 75. .10 65. .15 8.0 .0100 .00040 1.5 1.5
12 45. .05 45. .05 8.0 .0018 .00030 1.0 1.0
13 25. .03 50. .15 4.0 .0012 .00012 .5 1.5
14 30. .07 55. .18 5.0 .0010 .00010 .5 1.0
15 30. .07 55. .18 5.0 .0015 .00015 .5 1.0
16 95. .95 85. .90 7.0 .0020 .00030 2.5 3.0
17 95. .55 85. .35 7.0 .0025 .00040 2.5 3.0
18 60. .55 85. .65 8.0 .0020 .00040 2.0 2.5
19 60. .45 85. .45 8.0 .0025 .00050 2.0 2.5
20 60. .55 85. .65 8.0 .0030 .00030 2.5 1.0
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Table 16
Variables for Model Generating Program 
Al, Bl, A2, B2,
Bf C, D, R, S . . model coefficients
TENX ..........  starting quantity for product 1
I ..............  counter
DELTAC, DELTAB . incremental change in B and C
coefficients
TNI ............  total net income for current period
TNIP ..........  total net income for preceding period
Qlf Q 2 ........ product 1 and product 2 output
Z ............... intermediate product output
C C .............common variable cost
D C C D Z.......... derivative of common cost with respect
to Z - measures slope of a line tangent 
to common cost at the optimum point
Y I N T E R ........ intersection of tangent line with Y axis
HYP ............  length of tangent line between optimum
point and Y axis
COSPHI ........  cosine of angle formed between tangent
line and Y axis
D E L T A Z ........ change in Z required to move 10 units
along the tangent line
DCCDZM, DCCDZP . derivatives of common cost curve at
points ± 10 units of length from the
optimum point
RADIAN ........  measure of curvature
A V Z ............ slope of common cost curve at optimum
point
Z1 ............  optimum intermediate product output
START
READ
INPUT
LIST
OPTIMIZING
ROUTINE
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Figure 11
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(page 1 of 4)
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/20.DELTAC
DELTAB
IF
D = (AVZ - 
B + 2*C*Zl) 
/ (3*Z12)
Figure 11
Model Generating Program Flowchart 
(page 4 of 4)
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c
c
105
102
0
502
300
301
30*
306
312
500
M00EL GENERATING PRMORAM
THIS PROGRAM WAS HUN ON A XCROX SIGMA 9 COMPUTER 
F0RMAT(2(F2.0*F2.2)»F3.l,FA.A.F5.5»F2.0»2F2.1I
FORMAT(3X«I3*I2«3X«F6>5.3X«F4<1*3X«F6.5*3X«F7>6*3X»2(F5.1*3X)« 
F8«2/3x »2(F5*2#3X»F3*2/3x >/2(F3»1/3X)/2IF5»2/3X)>
HEaO(5,1O5.EN0-500IA1.01,A2,02#eiC/O#TENQl*R/S 
1 - 0
DEL rAC . C/20.
I - I ♦ 1 
Ul - • 6*TENU1
U2 - (2.*Bl*S/R*Ql-S/R*Al+A2)/(2.*02)
TNIP ■ 0 
Z - h*Ql+S#u2
Tn I ■ Al*Ul-Bl*Ql**2AA2*02-B2*02**2-B*2+C»2**2-D»Z**3
IFITNI .UT. TNIP)GO TO 301
TNIP ■ TNI
Cl - 01 ♦ .1*TENQ1
U2 - (2.*B1*S/R*U1-S/H*A1+A2)/(2.*B2)
GO TO 300
TNIP ■ TNI
Ul - Ul-.01*TENU1
U2 - (2.*Bl*S/R*Ul-S/R*Al+A2)/(2.*B2l 
Z m RAUI+SaQZ
TNI ■ Al*Ul-bl»Ql**2*A2*Q2-B2*Q2**2-B*2*C*Z**2-D»Z»*3
IF ( TNI .|_T. TNIP1G0 TO 304
GO TO 301
TNIP « TNI
Ul - Q1+.001*TENU1
U2 - (2.»dl«S/R»Ul-5/H*Al*A2)/(2.*B2>
Z ■ R*Q1+S*02
Tn I ■ A1*Ui-B1*Q1»*2«A2*Q2-B2*U2**2-B*Z^C*Z**2»D*Z**3
IF(TNI .LT. TNIP)GO TO 306
GO TO 30A
Ul - Ul••001 *TENUl
U2 - (2.»31*S/R*U1-S/H*A1*A2)/(2.*B2)
Z ■ R*Gl*S*Q2
CC ■ B*Z-C*Z**2*D*Z**3
TOTREV - AI*Q1"B1*Q1**2AA2*52"B2*32**2 
AVZ - CC/Z
0CCD2 - B-2.*C*Z*3.*D*Z**2
YINTER ■ CC - DCCDZ4Z
HYP - (Z**2A(CC-YINTERI*#2>**.5
COSPHI ■ Z/HYP
DELTAZ » 10•*C0SPH1
OCCDZP - a-2.*C*IZ+DELTAZ)*3.*D*<Z*0ELTAZ)*»2 
DCCDZM - B-2.»C*(Z-DELTAZ)*3.*D*IZ-DELTAZ)*«2 
RADIAN - (DCC0ZP-0CCDZM)/(1.*DCCDZP*DCCDZM)
IF 11 >EQ.1)AVZ1 ■ B-2.*C*Z+3.*D*Z**2
WRITE(6»102)J»K#KADIAN#B#C#D*Ql»Q2#TNIP*Ai#Bl#A2#B2*R/S#AVZ#AVZl
IF 11 .EC.. DD E L T A B  - (AVZl-3)/20.
IF(I .EC. 1)Z1 - Z 
c - C - DELTAC
o - e ♦ deltas
IF < C .LT* 0 >I GO TO 100 
D - IAVZ1-S*2.*C*Z1)/(3«*Zl**2)
GO TO 502
STOP
End
APPENDIX B 
TESTING PROGRAMS
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Table 17 
Variables for Testing Programs
Input List:
RADIAN ..........  curvature measure
TNIP ............  total net income potential
A1, Bl, A2, B2,
B, C, D, R, S . . model coefficients
Ql, Q 2 .optimum product outputs
Intermediate Storage:
TENX, TENY . . . .  starting quantities
X, Y ............  product quantities
T R A N S .......... marginal cost transfer price
S T D ............ standard unit cost
A V G ... average unit cost
NIX, NIY ........  current period product profits
PNIX, PNIY . . . .  preceeding period product profits
Z ..............  intermediate product quantity
C C .............. common variable cost
CCH, C C L ......... common variable cost at high and low
points of the relevant range
I N C Y C .time period counter
XDIFF, YDIFF . . . percentage change in product profit
from preceeding time period
INX, I N Y ........ if the most recent quantity change is
an increase, value 1, otherwise value 0
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READ
INPUT
LIST
AT
END
WRITE
OUTPUT
GO TO START
= R*X 
+ S*Y
PCT = 100* 
(TNIP-TNIS) 
/ TNIP
QUANTITIES
ADJUST
ADJUST 
with incre­
ment size 
.001
AVG = (B*Z 
-C*Z2+D*Z3)
ADJUST 
with incre­
ment size 
.001 and 
signs 
reversed
TNIS = Al* 
X-B1*X2+ 
A2*Y-B2*Y 
-B*Z+C*Z2 
- D*Z3
ADJUST 
with incre­
ment size 
.01 and 
signs 
reversed
TENX, X = 
.65*Q1 
TENY, Y = 
.75*Q2 
PNIXfPNIY
Figure 12
Program Flowchart for Testing Usage 
Cost Assignment Equilibrium 
(page 1 of 2)
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ADJUST QUANTITIES
ENTRY
NIY <
. PNIY
<EF ^  
NIX <
. PNIX
= R*X 
+ S*Y
AVG = B - 
C*Z + D*Z
S*Y
R*X +
AVG = B
AVG = B 
C*Z+D*Z
+ S*Y
R*X
TENX 
PNIX =
X-.l*
AVG = B - 
C*Z + D*Z
X = X+.l* 
TENX 
PNIX = NIX
Y = Y+.l* 
TENY 
PNIY = NIY
NIX = Al*X 
- B1*X2 - 
AVG*R*X
NIY = A2*Y 
- B2*Y2 - 
AVG*S*Y
= R*X 
+ S*Y
Y = Y-.l* 
TENY 
PNIY = 0
Figure 12
Program Flowchart for Testing Usage 
Cost Assignment Equilibrium 
(page 2 of 2)
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c
c
103
10*
105 
. *02
201
203
20*
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
21 *
500
USAGE ASSIGNMENT EQUILIBRIUM TEST
THIS PROGRAM WAS HUN ON A XEROX SIGMA 9 COMPUTER
FORMAT 113# I2#F’5*5*F3.1»F5.5»F6.6«2F*»1»F4.2#2(F2.0#F2.2I*SF2.11
K0RMAT(i 7X,F6#5#*X.F5#1»5X.F5#1#6X.F5.1»6X#F5.1#5X#F7#2»3X.F7.2#
fcX.F*-ll
MEACI5# 103#En Db 500II#*J#RAOIAN#6#C#0#Q1#Q2#TN1P#A1#S1#A2#B2#R#S
1LNX - .65.01
X • Tl.NX
1E NT ■ .75*02
T • TENT
Pn IX * 0
PNIY - c
I ■ R*X+S*Y
L • R*X*B*Y
LC • G*Z-C*Z**2*D*Z*»3 
M Y  ■ A2*Y«62*Y»*2-S»Y/Z*CC 
IF ( M T  .LT. PNIY IGO TO 20*
Y ■ V* . 1 *TENY 
PNIT ■ M Y
1*0 TO 2C3
Y • Y - >1*TENY 
P M Y  * C
I • H*X*S*Y
CC ■ b*Z-C*Z»»2*D»Z»*3
Nix • A1*X-B1*X**2-PR0X*X/2*CC
IF INJX .LT. PNIXIOO TO 206
X - X«-.C1*TEEX
MNIX ■ M X
GO TO 2CE
X ■ X+.01*TENX
I m R.X.S*Y
CC • il*Z-C*Z*»2*D»Z**3
NIT ■ A2*Y-B2*Y**2-S*Y/Z*CC
1 T I M Y  .LT. PNIYIGO TO 208
T » T«.(;i »TENY
PNIT - M Y
GO TO 2C7
T • Y*.ci*TENY
PNIX « C
PNIY *  c
i - R*X*S*Y
CC ■ H*Z-C*Z**2»D*Z**3
NIX ■ A1*X>B1»X**2-R*X/Z*CC
IF ( M X  .LT. PNIX IGO TO 210
PNIX « NJX
X • X-.C01*TENX
GO TO 2C9
X - X..C01*TENX
i • F«X*S*Y
CC ■ ll»Z“C*Z**2»0»Z*»3
Nix - A1*X»B1*X**2-W*X//*CC
IF ( M X  .CT. PNIXIGO TO 211
PNIX ■ NIX
GO TO 210
X ■ X-.001*TENX
I “ R»X*S*Y
CC ■ U*Z-C*Z**2*0*Z»*3
M Y  • A2*Y-R2*Y**2-S«Y/Z*CC
I F t M Y  .LT. PNIYIGO 10 213
PNIT » M Y
Y « Y-.001*TENY 
GO TO 212
Y • Y*.C01fTENY 
L * H*X*S*Y
CC " ')»7.L*Z.*2*0*Z*»3 
NIT ■ A2*Y>B2*Y«»2-S*Y/Z*CC 
1F1N1Y .LT. PNIYIOO TO 21*
PNIY - M Y  
GO Tt 213
Y « Y - •001yTENY 
L « R*X*S*Y
CC • ii.Z-C.Z*»2*D»Z**3
INIS - Al*X-bl*X*»2*A2*Y>B2*Y«*2-CC
GlFF » TNlp - T M S
PCT ■ i o o .»d i f f / t n i p
«RI 1Ei6,10*)RAD1AN.01.X»C2#Y,TMP»TMS»PCT
GO 10 105
STOP
END
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C HAMGlNAL C06T TRANSFER PRICING EQUILIBRIUM TEST
C Th u  PROGRAM -AS RUN ON A XEROX BtQHA f COMPUTER
103 f 0RNATU3* I
104 f o r m a t ti7A«r«*&#4x#r5«i*sx«F5«i#4i*F5«t'9x#FS«i#sx#r?*2#)x#F74** 
6X# F 4 • 1 I
105 HCAUlb»lO3»CN0«bOO}I *J#NAOlAN*R»C»0<Gl»OE«TNlP»Al#01iA8«iK#R«t
40? TENX • *65«Q1
x • H N k  
TESY • •75»0i*
Y • TtNY 
PN|X - C 
p n |y ■ o
i m H « M S * V
SI0 • P • 2*4C«Z ♦ 3«*D«Z*«2
201 M X  - M*X-B1#k»#2*N*i*VTD 
JFfNI* »L 7 • Pn J M U O T P  202
X a x 4 .l*,TtO 
Hh|* - M X
i • fc*k«s*r
STO • B - 2*tC4{ 4 3**0*Z**2
' Ul TO 201
202 A • X • • 1*72 NX
PN|X • C
1 • N«ci«9«n?
STO •  P •  ? « 4 C W  4 3 « 4 D 4 f * » 2
20? NiY • A2«Y«B24Y44?*S*Y»yT0
I F I N I Y  . u r .  PNIYIGO TO 204 
T • Y4« j # TCNY 
PNIY •  M Y  
/ • H*k«fi4Y
STO ■ P - 2»*C*2 ♦ 3»40*2*«2
00 10 2C3
204 r • Y • • I• TEn Y
FN|Y ■ C
2 • R»X«S*Y
STD • B • 2«*C*Z 4 3»*042««2
205 M X  - Al«X«ni4X44t*R’X*ST0
IF I N|x .IT. Pn IXIUO TO 204 
X a X«.H*TCNX
PNIX • XI*
1 a ft»X*S*Y
STO • ft • 2* *C*Z 4 3*«0«Z«42 
uc to 205
206 * • Ra *C1«TCNX
t - R - R 4 S * Y
sro • B • 2 •*C*Z 4 3««D«Z«*2
207 M Y  • A*4Y-Q2*Y*»2«3»Y.*T0
IFIMV .11. Fn IYIUO TO 204 
T . V.ci*rtKV
P M  Y • M Y  
t  •  m»«4S*y
bTO -  is •  2 * * C * z  *  3 « » 0 * ?« * 2
00 To 207
208 Y a Y*.C14TEXY
1 a N»X484Y
bTO • R • 2•*C*Z ♦ J«4042*42
PNIX • 0 
PNIY • C
209 Nix • Ai»Xa()i»x*»2aM«x«ST0
IF < M  x .LT. P M  * I GO TO 210 
PHI* • M X
x ■ X-.COWTENX
/ a NtX«84V
bTO • 8 • 2«#c9l 4 3*«04f««2
00 TO 2C9
210 x a X4«0Ol»T£NX
1 • H«X«S»Y
bTC ■ B ■ 2«*C*Z ♦ ?*»0»7»42 
N]x ■ Al*X-Rl*X*4J-W4X4yT0 
IFtNlX .IT. PH]XI GO TO 211 
Phjx • M X  
00 10 210
211 x a X-.C01MCNX
i a H«X«S*Y
STD - b • 2.*c*z ♦ 3t«D*Z»«?
212 NlY • A2*YaB2*Y**2«S*YabT0
IHhlT .IT. Pn IYIOO TO 213 
PM | Y • M Y
Y ■ Y-*C01*TCnY
t m R«X*S*Y
bTO • 8 • 2«*C*Z43**0*Z4«2
00 TO 212
213 Y a Y4.001»TENY
Z ■ R*X*S#Y
bTO • B • 2**C*Z4j.*0*Z**2
M Y  ■ A2*Y-B2»Y**2-8*Y#8T0 
IF(NJY .LT. PNIYIGO TO 214 
PNIY • M Y  
00 TO 213
214 Y a t • .OOIMENY 
Z • ft*X4S*V
CC ■ 04ZaC«2*«2404Z443
Th is • Al*Xabl»X**24A?»Y.B*4V4*2-CC
U1FF a I M P  a THIS 
PCT ■ 100»40|FF/TN!P
” M T E I 6 * l O 4 | M A 0 l A N » J 1 * A » C 2 * > t T M P « T N l B « P C T
00 TO 105 
500 STOP
En q
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C STANUARC COSTING EUUlLlbRIl.P TEST
c this program xas run on a xerox sigma 9 computer
103 EORMAT ( 13# I2#Fb#5#F3.1#P5.5. Fb•6#2F*•1<r6•2# 2IF2#0#F2#2 I «2F2#1 I
10* fORMAT(17X.F6.5# A *#F5•1 • 5X. F5.1#6X,F5.1#5X#F5.1#5X<F7•2#3X*F7.*.
6X,F*#ll
105 NtAD(5#l03,EN0-500II»J#KAO I AN,B#C#0#Ul#02#TNIP»A1,B1#A2,B2»K#S
*02 TENX ■ #65*01
x « TtNX 
TENY - #75*02 
T - TEN*
PNIX - c 
PNIY ■ C
1 ■ R*Cl*S*QH
CCH - b*l#05*Z-C*tl#05*Z)**2*0»tl#05*ZI**3 
CCL ■ b*.95*<i“C*l #9S*ZI**2*C* t #95*2 1**3
STO - (CCM-CCLI/I #1*21
201 n i x ■ A1*X-B1*X**2-R»X*ST0
IF(NIX #|_T. PNIXIGOTP 202
X - X ♦ .1 *TLNX 
PNIX * m x  
GO TO 2C1
202 A b x - •1*TENX
PNIX • C
203 NIY * A2*Y»R2*Y**2*S*Y*STC
1F1N1Y #LT. Pn IYIGO TO 20*
T * y *#i *teny
PNIY - M Y  
GO TO 203 
20* T * Y » #l*TLIY
PNIY - C
205 NIX b A1»X-B1****2-R*X»STD
IF I N1 X #LT. PNIXIGO TO 206 
X b X-#C1»TENX
PNIX » M X  
GO 10 2C5
206 X b X*#C1*TENa
207 NIY b A2*Y-(»2*T**2-S*T*ST0
IFINIY #|_T. PNIYIGO TO 208
Y * Y-.C1*TENY 
PNIY - M Y
GO TO 2C7
208 Y b Y+#Cl*rfcNT 
PNIX b 0
PNIY b c
209 NIX b A1*X-B1*X**2“R*X*STD
IF I NIX #LT. PNIXIGO TO 210 
PNIX b m x
X b X-#001*T£NX 
GO TO 209
210 X b X*#001*TEUX
NIX b A1*X«31*X**2-R*X*ST0 
IF(NIX #LT. PNIXIGO TO 211 
PNIX b m x  
GO TO 210
211 X  b X - # 0 O 1 » T l NX
212 NIY b A2*Y-B2*Y**2-S*Y*STD
IFINIY #LT. PNIYIGO TO 213 
PNIY b m y
Y b r-#C01*TENY 
GO TO 212
213 Y b Y*#001*TENY
NIY b a 2*YbB2*Y**2-«I*Y*ST0 
IFINIY .LT. PNIYIGO TO 21*
PNIY - M Y  
00 TO 213 
21* T b y . #001*TENY
2 b R*x*S*Y
TNIS b ai*x»B1*X**2*A2*Y-B2*Y**2bB*2*C*Z**2-0*Z**3
DIFF b TMip . TNIS 
PCT ■ 100* *DIFF/TNIP
»RITEI6#10*IRA0IAN#U1.X»Q2.Y.TNIP,TNIS#PCT 
00 TO 105 
500 STOP
END
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C
c
10310%
103*02
201
202 
203 '
20%
206
206
207
20H
209
210
211
212
213
21%
MARKET v a l u e  ASMGNHENl EQUILIBRIUM t e s t
IHIS H*eG*A*1 WAti HUS ON A XEROX SIQMA 9 COMPUTE*
F CANA I113#I2.r5»6*F3.1*rs.5#r€.6#2F%.l,f4.2,2ir2.0.r?«2)#fF2»t I 
FCwnAT<l7X,r6«5#%x#Fb*li5K*F5*l#6X*F5.i»5X#r5*l*5x#F7«2*3K,r7«2i 
6X # F % • 1 I
r» « o
HEAIML#103»EN0*M;0II#JiN aOIAN#B<C*0»«1»02*Tn IP»*1*B1*A2#S2#R#I 
U s *  • .65*01 
X • U N A  
TENT • .75*0?
T • TENT
PNIX • 0 *
PN1T • 0
nr • A2*r»82»T**2
i • k»x«s*y
CC ■ b«2*C*Z'«2+0»2*O
NX • Al«lt>tll*(f*r
NIX - NA.« MX/|HA%MTl*CC
iriNi>. .LT. p m k i o u t m  tog
x ■ k ♦ t1aTENX
PNIX • N|X
GO TO 2C1
X • X • *1»TENX
PN|A - o
MX • A1*X“81*X**2 
t m M*X«S«V
CC • M7«C*Z*»2*D»Z**3
sir • »r • r >/«r «*r v i »cc
IF 1 M Y  .LT. PNIT»00 TO 20%
Y • Y♦#1•TENY 
PNIY • M Y
NY ■ A2*vH2%T**2 
GO TU 2C3 
T - Y • •1%TCNV 
PNIY - C
NY • A2*Y«82»Y«*2
I • R«X+S*Y
CC • H»Z«C%Z**20*Z** J
NX ■ Al«X*8l%V»«2
NJX • RA • RX/|MX*MY)*CC
IP INI X «LT< PNlXinn TO 206
X - X*•Cl * TENX
PNIX • M X
GO TO 209
x • x*«ci«TENX
NX • A1*X*81•X*%?
I • H*A♦S*Y
CC • 0*2»c»z**2%0*2»*3
NY • A2*Y«a2»Y«*2
M Y  • RY • RY/tR*%MYI*CC
1FIN1V .LT. PN1YI30 TO 203
Y • Y-.C1MCNY 
PNIY • M Y
GO TO 207
Y - Y*.C1*TENT 
PNIX • o
Pn IY • c
NY • A2*Y-82*Y**2 
I m M«X«S»Y
CC ■ d*2-C*Z**2%U*Z*%3
NX • A|«t-el*X*#2
NIX • RA • RX/(RX%RV|*CC
IF (M X  .Li. P U A iQO ro 210
P M X  • M X
x • X*«ti01»TC*X
GO TO 209
A • X*.C01»TENX
t m R«A*S»Y
CC - 8*2»C*2**2%D*Z*0
NX • A 1 •X»B1•*•*2
N U  - fix * R*/IRA*RYI*CC
u i M x  «cr« pnjxjqo ro 2 n
PNIX ■ M x
GO TO 210
X a X**C01»TENX
NX ■ Al«X*d1»M«r
1 a P*X«S*Y
CC • U*Z*C»Z*«Ml«li»J
NY ■ A**Y»d2*r%*2
NIY - RY • RY/|MX%NYI*CC
IFINIY .LT. PNIVIQO TO 213
PNIY • M Y
T • Y-.COUTENY
GO TO 212
Y a Y*«001«TENV
Nr - A2«vd2*r**2
2 ■ R%A«S%Y
CC « H*2-CfZMM)i2«»]
NIf - RY • RY/|HX%RYI*CC
iFiNiY «lt. pnivioo rn 21%
PNIY • M Y  
GO TO 213
Y • Y • .001%TENY 
MY ■ A2aV82»Y«*2 
I m N*X«t*Y
CC ■ B*Z“C*Z*%2%0*2%%3
TNIS • RX ♦ MY • CC 
0|FF • TNIP • TNIS 
PCT « 100*#0IPP/TNIP
NRITt U#l0*JHADUN.Ql.X,0t» Y,TNtP,TNlS»PCT 
GO TO 105 
• TOP
END
START
READ
INPUT
LIST
XDIFF
YDIFF
XDIFF = .05 
YDIFF = .03
X = 1.5*Q1 
Y = -.45*Q2 
INCYC = -1
V ____
DETERMINE 
PREVIOUS 
PRODUCT 
INCOME
X = 1.45*Q1 
Y = 1.5*Q2 
INX = 0 
INY = 1
DETERMINE
CURRENT
PRODUCT
INCOME
&
INCYC = 
INCYC + 1
DECISION
ROUTINE
DETERMINE
CURRENT
PRODUCT
INCOME
TNIS = Al*X 
-B1*X2+A2*Y 
-B2*Y2-B*Z
+c *z2-d *z3
PCT(INCYC) 
= 100*TNIS 
/ TNIP
iy
INCYC < 
12
WRITE 
OUTPUT
3 E Z
(GO TO START)
Figure 13
Program Flowchart for
Dynamic Usage Test
(page 1 of 3)
DETERMINE
PREVIOUS
PRODUCT
INCOME
DETERMINE
CURRENT
PRODUCT
INCOME
ENTRY
EXIT
= R*X 
+ S*Y
PNIY = A2*Y 
- B2*Y2 - 
AVG*S*Y
AVG = B - 
C*Z + D*Z2
PNIX = A1*X 
- B1*X2 - 
AVG*R*X
ENTRY
= R*X 
+ S*Y
NIX = Al*X 
- Bl*X2 - 
AVG*R*X
NIY = A2*Y 
- B2*Y2 - 
AVG*S*Y
AVG = B - 
C*Z + D*Z
Figure 13
Program Flowchart for
Dynamic Usage Test
(page 2 of 3)
^  ENTRY ^
INXIF
INX
XDIFF*Q1
IF
INX
INX
XDIFF*Q1
XDIFF*Q1
PNIX = NIX €
INY = 0IF/ I F N  
PNIY > 
. NIY .
INY
YDIFF*Q2
IF
INY YDIFF*Q2
INY
YDIFF*Q2
YDIFF*Q2
PNIY = NIY
Figure 13
Program Flowchart for
Dynamic Usage Test
(page 3 of 3)
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C DYNAMIC MARGINAL COST TKANSFER PRICING TEST
c this program was run on a xerox sigma 9 computer
d i m e n s i o n  PCT112I
127 FOPMAT(20X*F6.5*1X»1PF6«1t
1 FORMAT(I3i2X#F5*5#F3il#F5*5#F6*6#2FA»l#F6.2/2(F2.0#F2»2I«EF2*H
N ■ 0
201 KEAU(S»1« END“50)l»KADIAN*B»C#D»QliQ2*TNlP*Al#Bl*A2»B2#R*S 
IF(N .EC. I)GO TO 202
XDIFF « .03 
YDIFF - .03
IF(01 «GT* Q2 I YDIFF - .05
1FIU2 .GT• Q1)XDIFF - .05
202 X ■ »5*G1
Y - .55*02 
INX - 1 
INY - 0
L -  R * X + S * Y
STD ■ B»2.*C*Z+3.*D*Z**2 
PNIX - A1*X-B1*X**2-R*X*ST0 
PNIY - A2*Y-B2*Y**2-S*Y*STD 
X ■ >55*01
Y - «S*G2
Z ■ R*X+S*Y
STD - B-2.*C*Z*3.*D*Z**2 
NIX * A1*X-B1*X**2-R*X*STD 
NIY ■ A2*Y-B2*Y**2-8*Y*STD 
INCYC - 0
*01 IF(PNIX .QT> NlXIGO TO 50*
IF(INX .eo. 1)00 TO 501
X - X-XDIFF*Q1 
GO TO 505
501 X m X+X0IFF*Q1 
GO TO 505
50* IF!INX .EQ. 1 )U0 TO 502
INX ■ 1
X - X ♦ XDIFF*01 
GO TO 505
502 INX - 0
X ■ X-XDIFF*Q1
505 PNIX - M X
IFIPNIY .GT. NIYIGO TO 505 
IF(INY >£Q. 1 )G0 TO 506
Y - Y - YDIFF*Q2 
GO TO 602
506 Y • Y ♦ Y0IFFWQ2 
GO TO 602
508 IFIINY .EQ. 1 IGO TO 601
INY - 1
Y - Y ♦ YDIFF*Q2 
GO TO 602
601 INY - 0
Y - Y - YDIFF*Q2
602 PNIY - NIY 
INCYC - INCYC ♦ 1 
I m R * X 4 S * Y
CC ■ B*Z»C«Z**2+D*Z**3
STO ■ B-2.*C*Z*3«*D*Z**2
NIX ■ A1*X-B1*X**2-R*X*STD
NIY ■ A2*Y-B2*Y**2-S*Y*STD
TNIS ■ A1*X-81*X**2*A2*Y-B2*Y**2“CC
PCT <INCYCI - 100.*TNI8/TNIP
IF(INCYC .LT* 12IGO TO *01
WRITE(6«l27)RADlAN#PCTIl)*PCT(2)*PCT(3)#PCT(*)»PCT(5)»PCTI6l» 
PCT(7 > tPCT(8 I# PCT(9 11PCT«10 I,PCT(111 $PCT(121 
GO TO 201 
50 STOP
e nd
c
c
127
1
201
20?
401
501
50*
502
505
506
508
601
602
50
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DYNAMIC USAGE ASSIGNMENT TEST
THIS PROGRAM WAS RUN ON A XEROX SIQMA 9 COMPUTER 
DIMENSION P C T U 2 )
FORMAT ( 2 0 X , F 6 i S M X # 1 2 P b * H
FORMAT <13#2X#F5*5#F3.1#F5«5#F6.6#2F*.1#F6.2#2{F2»0«F2*2» #2F2.1»
N • 0
HEAD(5#l,END-50)1»RADI AN,B#C#D #Q1#Q2#TNIP#A1,b 1#A2#B2#R#S 
IF(N .EC* I KiO TO 202 
N - I
XD1FF - .03 
YOIFF - .03
IF(U1 .QT* U2IYD1FF - .05 
IF(U2 .GT* U1TXD1FF - .05 
X - 1.5*01
Y ■ 1 . 4 5 * 0 2  
I NX - 0
INY - 1 
L • R*X*S*Y
CC ■ B*Z-C*Z**2*D*Z**3 
PNIX - A1*X-B1*X**2-R*X/Z*CC 
PNIY • A2*Y-B2*Y**2-S*Y/Z*CC 
X • 1*45*01 
T ■ 1.5*02 
L ■ K*X+S*Y
CC - b*Z"C*Z**2*D*Z**3 
M X  ■ A1*X-B1*X**2-R*X/Z*CC 
M Y  - A2*Y-32*Y**2-S*Y/Z*CC 
1NCYC ■ 0
IF(PNIX .GT* NlXJGO TO 50*
1FIINX .EU. 1)00 TO 501 
X ■ X-XD1FF*G1 
GO TO £05 
X - X+XCIFF*01 
GO TO 5C5
IF(INX .ECU 1)GO TO 502 
1 NX ■ 1
X - X 4 XDIFF*U1 
GO TO 5C5 
1 NX - 0
X - X-XDIFF*Ci1 
PNIX - M X
IF(PNIY .GT. NIYIGO TO 508 
1FIINY .EQ. 1)G0 TO 506
Y - Y - YOlFF *Q2 
GO 10 6C2
Y ■ Y ♦ YDIFF*C2 
GO TO 6C2
IF(INY .EU. 1 (GO TO 601 
INY - 1
Y • Y ♦ YDIFF*02 
GO TO 602
lNY ■ 0
Y - Y - Y0IFF*Q?
PNIY - M Y
1NCYC • INCYC ♦ 1 
I - R*X*S*Y
CC * B*Z-C*Z**2+D*Z**3
M X  ■ A1*X-B1*X**2-R*X/Z*CC
NIY ■ A2*Y-B2*Y**2-S*Y/Z*CC
TNIS - A1*X-B1*X**2+A2*Y-B2*Y**2-CC
PCTIINCYC) - 100.*TNIS/TNIP
IF(INCYC ‘UT* 12 I GO TO *01
WRITE(6,l27)RADIAN#PCT<l)#PCT<2)#PCT<3)#PCT(*)#P C T (51#P C T (6># 
PCT«7)#PCT(8)»PCTO)#PCT(10)»PCT(11)#PCT<12>
GO TO 201
STOP
END
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C DYNAMIC STANDARD COSTING TEST
C THIS RKCGIUM HAS RUN ON  ^ XEROX SIGMA 9 COMPUTER
U1MEN3I0N PCT(12)
127 F0RMAT»20A#F6.5»lX#t2F6.1>
1 (■ ORMA T(I3»2X#F6*b#F3.1#K5.5#FA.6»2FA*l/F6.2,2(F2*0#F2.2)»2F2.1 )
N » 0
201 NEAO<5,i,EnO-5OII#HAOIAN,0#C,O*U1,Q2#TMP» A1,B1/A2»B2»R»8
1F(N *EG • I )GO TO 202
N - I
XDIFF ■ .03 
YDIFF - .03
IF (U1 .GT* Q2IYDIFF - .05 
IFIQ2 .GT* UDXD1FF - .05
202 X - 1 «5*Q1
Y - 1.45*02 
INX “ 0
INY - 1 
Z - R*CJ1 + S*Q2
CCH - B*l.o5*Z-C*(1.05*Z)**2'fD*11.05*Z)**3 
CCL - B*.95*Z-C*I.95*Z)**2*D*(*95*Z)**3 
STD - tCCH-CCL)/«.1*Z)
PNIX ■ Al*X-Bl*X**2-K*X*STD 
PNIY ■ a 2*Y-02*Y**2-S*Y*ST0 
X ■ 1«45*Ul
Y - 1.5*02
NIX - A1*X-B1*X**2»R*X*STD 
M Y  ■ A2*Y-B2*Y**2-8*Y*8T0 
INCYC - 0
401 IFIPMX .GT. NIXIUO TO 504
IF IINX .EG. 1>00 TO 501 
X ■ X-XDIFF*Ql 
GO TO 505
501 X - X+XCIKF*U1
00 TO 505
504 IF<INX ,EQ. 11 GO TO 502
INX » 1
X - X ♦ XDIFF*Q1 
GO TO 505
502 INX ■ 0
X - X-XCIFF*Q1
505 PNIX - M X
IF(PNIY .GT. NIYJGO TO 508 
IF(INY .EQ. 1 >GS TO 506
Y - Y - Y0IFF*Q£
GO TO 602
506 Y ■ Y ♦ YDIFF*Q2 
GO TO 602
508 IF{INY .EU. 1 I GO TO 601
INY ■ 1
Y - Y ♦ YDIFF*Q2
GO TO 602
601 INY - 0
Y ■ Y - Y0IFF*Q2
602 PNIY - M Y  
INCYC - INCYC ♦ 1
1 - PROX*X*PROY*Y
CC ■ B*z-C*z**2*0*z**3
Nix - A1*X-B1*X**2-R*X*STD
M Y  ■ A2*Y-B2*Y**2-8*Y*8T0
TNIS - A1*X-B1*X**2+A2*Y-B2*Y**2-CC
PCTIINCYC) - 100.*TNI8/TNIP
IF(INCYC «LT. 12)GO TO 401
PRITE(6,127)RA0IAN.PCT(1)#PCT(2)#PCTI3)»PCT<4)»PCT(5)#PCTI6)» 
PCT<7>#PCT(B)«PCT(9>»PCT<tO)>PCTI11)#PCTC12>
GO TO 201
50 STOP
ENO
DYNAMIC MARKET VALUE ASSIGNMENT TEST
THIS PROGRAM MAS RUN ON A XEROX SIGMA 9 COMPUTER
DIMENSION PCT(12)
FORMAT(20X*F6'S«1X«12F6>1)
FORMAT(I3»2X#F5.5»F3.1»F5.5*F6.6a 2F4.1#F6.2»2(F2.0#F2«2)»2F2.1
N - 0
READ(5*1,END-50)1.RADIAN,B.C.O/Ql*Q2#TMP# A1»B1«A2.B2.RfS 
IFIN .EG. I)GO TO 202 
N ■ I
XDIFF ■ .03 
YD IFF - .03
IF(Q1 *GT" Q2)YDIFF - .05 
IF(02 >GT. OllXDIFF - .05 
X - 1*5*01
Y - 1>45*02 
INX - 0
INY - 1 
I m R*X+S*Y
CC - H*Z-C*2**2+0*Z**3 
RX - A1*X-B1*X**2
KY - A2*Y-B2*Y**2 
PNIX - RX-RX*CC/(RX+RY)
PNIY - RY-RY*CC/(RX*RY)
X - 1*45*01
Y - 1«5*Q2 
Z - H*X*S*Y
CC - U*Z-C*Z**2+D*2**3 
RX - A1*X-B1*X**2 
HY - A2*Y-B2*Y**2 
NIX ■ RX-RX*CC/(RX4RY)
NIY - RY-RY*CC/«RX*RY)
INCYC - 0
IF(PNIX • 3T< NIXIQO TO 504 
IF(INX .FU. 1 IGO TO 501 
X - X-XDIFF*Q1 
00 TO 505
X - x *x d i f f *qi
00 TO 505
IF(INX .£0. 1 IGO TO 502
1 NX ■ 1
X • X ♦ XDIFF*Q1 
00 TO 505 
INX - 0
X - X-X0IFF*(11 
PNIX - M X
IF (P M  Y .QT. NIYIQO TO 508 
IF(INY .£Q. 1 I GO TO 506
Y - Y - YDIFF*Q2 
GO TO 602
Y - Y ♦ YDIFF*02 
00 TO 6C2
IF ( INY .CU. 1IGI) TO 601 
INY ■ 1
Y - Y ♦ Y0IFF*Q2 
00 TO 602
INY ■ 0
Y - Y - YDIFF*Q2 
PNIY - M Y  
INCYC - INCYC ♦ 1 
Z - R*X*S*Y
CC - U*Z-C*Z**2+D*Z**3 
RX - A1*X-B1*X**2 
HY - A2*Y»B2*Y**2 
NIX - RX-RX*CC/<RX4RY)
NIY - RY-RY*CC/(HX4RY)
Tn IS - A1*X“B1*X**2*A2*Y»B2*Y**2-CC 
PCT <INCYC) - 100.*TNIS/TNIP 
IF(INCYC *LT• 12)00 TO 401
WRITE(6.127)RADIAN.PCT(1)»PCTC2>.PCT(3)»PCT<4)»PCT(5).PCT(*). 
PCT<7).PCT(8).PCT|9l»PCT(10).PCT(ll)»PCT(l2)
GO TO 201 
STOP j 
END
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